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Identity has long played a critical role in policing.  Learning “who” an 
individual is not only affords police knowledge of possible criminal history, but 
also of “what” an individual might have done.  To date, however, these 
matters have eluded sustained scholarly attention, a deficit that has assumed 
ever greater significance as government databases have become more 
comprehensive and powerful.  Identity evidence, in short, has and continues to 
suffer from an identity crisis, which this Article seeks to remedy.  The Article 
does so by first surveying the methods historically used by police to identify 
individuals, from nineteenth-century efforts to measure bodies and note 
physical marks to today’s sophisticated biometric identifiers.  As this history 
makes clear, the American justice system has not kept pace with evolving 
developments and has failed to impose meaningful limits on identity evidence.  
The Article highlights this shortcoming and offers a remedy, focusing on two 
central, yet unresolved questions: (1) whether and how limits should be placed 
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on the collection, retention and use of legally obtained identity evidence, DNA 
in particular, and (2) whether identity evidenced illegally secured by police 
should be subject to suppression.  In doing so, the Article provides a much-
needed analytic framework for courts as they seek to balance social control 
needs and individual civil liberties.  
INTRODUCTION  
In the summer of 2011, news outlets triggered public concern with reports of 
American police using hand-held, high-tech gadgets to record and analyze the 
eyes and faces of detained individuals.1  To those unfamiliar with the history of 
American law enforcement, the reaction was perhaps understandable, affording 
further evidence of the nation’s headlong descent into Orwellian 
totalitarianism.  
Scholars familiar with longstanding police use of physical traits to overcome 
personal anonymity, however, were less alarmed.  Indeed, physiognomy, from 
the earliest efforts to brand offenders, through nineteenth-century innovations 
like photography and fingerprinting, has figured centrally in law enforcement.  
Conceived in this broader historical context, the high-tech gadgetry reported on 
by the media represents a change in modus operandi, not principle.  
What does warrant surprise, however, is the failure of modern day courts to 
impose meaningful limits on the identification methods used by police.  
Seemingly content to be the handmaidens of technology, state and federal 
courts alike have failed to grasp the critical significance of identity evidence 
and have left undeveloped an entire jurisprudence regarding when such 
evidence can be collection, retained, and used.  With the advent of DNA 
sampling by police, a potent new form of identity evidence also capable of 
revealing sensitive personal information, courts have at last voiced a measure 
of concern.  Yet courts remain largely oblivious to the need for limits on police 
authority to reveal personal identity more generally, a matter assuming ever-
greater importance as state, local, and federal databases become more 
sophisticated and better integrated.  
This Article constitutes a threshold effort to remedy the situation.  It does so 
by looking at two central issues concerning identity evidence.  First, the Article 
considers whether the collection, retention, and use of identity evidence – 
DNA samples in particular – qualify as an unreasonable search under the 
Fourth Amendment.  The most important decision to date on the issue, from 
 
1 See, e.g., Zach Howard, Police to Begin iPhone Iris Scans amid Privacy Concerns, 
REUTERS, July 20, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/assets/print?aid=USTRE76J4A120110720;   
D. Parvaz, Mobile Biometrics to Hit U.S. Streets, ALJAZEERA (Aug. 2, 1011), 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011/07/20117258145965608.html; New Police 
Scanner Raises “Facial Profiling” Concerns (NPR radio broadcast Aug. 11, 2011); Emily 
Steel & Julia Angwin, Device Raises Fear of Facial Profiling, WALL ST. J., 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303678704576440253307985070.html 
(last updated Aug. 16, 2011). 
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the Third Circuit Court of Appeals sitting en banc and splitting eight to six, 
evinces a basic confusion over the role of identity evidence, blurring a key 
distinction between identity verification and investigation.2  The conflation of 
purposes (ascertaining who an individual is and what that individual might 
have done or will do) is hugely important given the unprecedented legal 
authority now enjoyed by police to seize individuals for major and minor 
offenses alike and ongoing government efforts to expand target populations for 
DNA collection.  
Second, the Article examines the judicial failure to clarify how identity 
evidence should be handled when police illegally seize an individual and 
secure such evidence, a matter Professor Wayne LaFave notes “has caused the 
courts particular difficulty.”3  The uncertainty was manifest in the Supreme 
Court’s recent decision to grant and then dismiss certiorari in a case 
concerning the issue after a remarkably rambling and disjointed oral 
argument.4  Lacking direction, courts have adopted strikingly different 
positions on whether, and to what extent, identity evidence can be the proper 
subject of suppression.5  
The confusion exhibited by courts in these two areas highlights the critical 
need for an analytic framework for handling identity evidence, which this 
Article seeks to provide.  Part I offers an overview of the enduring desire of 
individuals and governments alike to overcome anonymity, especially in the 
face of possible criminal risk.  Part II surveys the evolving array of 
identification methods used by police, from the nineteenth century to the 
present.  Part III examines the ways in which the justice system handled 
identity evidence over this same period.  While at the outset the collection, 
retention, and use of identity evidence was permitted under limited 
circumstances, over time courts became far more indulgent, based on a 
misapprehension of the historical record and a disregard for the synergistic 
relationship between the growing sophistication of identification methods and 
the legal authority of police.  To illustrate this failing, the Article examines 
caselaw in the two contexts noted above and explores the significant doctrinal 
and practical difficulties presented by each.  Part IV closes with a discussion of 
the ways in which the currently under-regulated and under-theorized state of 
affairs can be improved, providing an analytic framework for courts as they 
address the challenges presented by identity evidence.  
 
2 See United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc), cert. denied, 132 
S. Ct. 1741 (2012).  
3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 
11.4, at 347 (4th ed. 2004). 
4  See Tolentino v. New York, 131 S. Ct. 1387 (2011).   
5  See infra Part III.B.2. 
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I. OVERCOMING ANONYMITY 
The desire to know one’s fellow community members, especially those 
prone to engage in criminal activity, has deep and enduring roots.6  To satisfy 
this desire societies have resorted to a variety of methods, including the 
physical branding and mutilation of offenders.7  Over time, however, as 
corporeal techniques passed from acceptability,8 governments sought more 
bureaucratic and systematic means of identification.9 
In England, for instance, London’s court at Bow Street initiated a registry in 
1753 containing names and descriptions of all persons suspected of having 
committed fraud or a felony, highlighting the reality of repeat offending.10  In 
1844, the French ascribed semantic distinction to the phenomenon, coining the 
term récidiviste.11  By the mid-nineteenth century, the reality of individual 
recidivism had influenced a change in perspective, with European governments 
shifting their concern from dangerous classes to dangerous individuals.  As 
historian John Pratt described it, criminal danger became 
a quality that is no longer possessed by a class but by individuals or small 
groups of criminals; it is a quality that no longer threatens to tear down 
the portals of the state in an orgy of blood and destruction; instead, it is 
targeted at the quality of life of its individual subjects.12 
Developing awareness of the individualized nature of criminality had a 
critically important influence on the administration of justice, which during the 
late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries increasingly sought to 
individualize sanctions.  This was especially evident in the early American 
republic, where two developments, both contingent on the ability to distinguish 
 
6 Jeremy Bentham captured this anxiety in his plaintive query in 1843: “Who are you, 
with whom I have to deal?” 1 JEREMY BENTHAM, Principles of Penal Law, in WORKS OF 
JEREMY BENTHAM 557 (John Hill Burton et al. eds, Russell & Russell, Inc. 1962) (1843).   
7 See Pieter Spierenburg, The Body and the State: Early Modern Europe, in THE OXFORD 
HISTORY OF THE PRISON 45, 48, 53 (Norval Morris & David J. Rothman eds., 1998).  
8  Id. at 53. 
9 This impetus first manifested in the late thirteenth century, with governments 
exchanging names and basic physical descriptions of outlaws.  Valentin Groebner, 
Describing the Person, Reading the Signs in Late Medieval and Renaissance Europe: 
Identity Papers, Vested Figures, and the Limits of Identification, 1400-1600, in 
DOCUMENTING INDIVIDUAL IDENTITY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF STATE PRACTICES IN THE 
MODERN WORLD 15, 25-26 (Jane Caplan & John Torpey eds., 2001). 
10 2 LEON RADZINOWICZ, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH CRIMINAL LAW 46-47 (1956).  Shortly 
thereafter, coordination and communication was enhanced by a Police Gazette, disseminated 
throughout the country on a quarterly and weekly basis, which contained information on 
offenders-at-large and their crimes.  Id. at 47-54.     
11 SIMON A. COLE, SUSPECT IDENTITIES: A HISTORY OF FINGERPRINTING AND CRIMINAL 
IDENTIFICATION 15 (2001). 
12 JOHN PRATT, GOVERNING THE DANGEROUS: DANGEROUSNESS, LAW AND SOCIAL 
CHANGE 13, 17 (1997).  
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criminal actors, were taking hold.  The first was the imposition of sentence 
enhancements on repeat offenders.13  If such individuals were to be held 
accountable and singled out for heightened punishment, they had to be reliably 
identified.  
The second development concerned the goal of offender rehabilitation, 
which took root in late-eighteenth-century, Quaker-dominated Pennsylvania 
and grew to be the dominant model in emergent prisons in Jacksonian 
America.14  Under the rehabilitative model, not all convicts were seen as 
similarly predisposed to recidivism.  If prisons were to avoid serving as 
“schools for crime,” repeat criminal offenders needed to be identified and 
isolated from their less crime-prone peers.15  Moreover, in order for reform to 
be successful, punishments needed to be tailored to the offending histories and 
backgrounds of individual offenders.  
To this end, between 1790 and the 1820s, officials at Philadelphia’s Walnut 
Street Jail endeavored to distinguish newly arrived offenders using criminal 
history as a basis for categorization.16  Such efforts, however, were 
unsuccessful for two chief reasons.  First, clerks failed to consistently and 
comprehensively record identity data on convicts.17  For instance, one clerk 
might note the height of a convict, while another would not.  Furthermore, the 
data points recorded often included vague or relative matters or descriptors 
(e.g., “quick” speech, “sallow” complexion) and focused on too few 
unalterable features (e.g., height); worse yet, records reflected matters capable 
of fabrication (e.g., place or date of birth).18  
Second, and equally important, the information gathered was not amenable 
to easy or systematic retrieval.  Records were stored according to sentencing 
date with no capacity for cross referencing, requiring officials to review the 
entirety of jail records.19  While the mid-1820s saw an increase in the 
 
13 See Note, Selective Incapacitation: Reducing Crime Through Predictions of 
Recidivism, 96 HARV. L. REV. 511, 511 n.1 (1982). 
14 David J. Rothman, Perfecting the Prison: United States, 1789-1865, in THE OXFORD 
HISTORY OF THE PRISON, supra note 7, at 100, 105-07 (discussing Jacksonian reformers’ 
belief that “prison [should] transform the deviant into a law-abiding citizen, that is, 
rehabilitate the offender”). 
15 Pamela Sankar, State Power and Record-Keeping: The History of Individualized 
Surveillance in the United States, 1790-1935, at 70-72 (Jan. 1, 1992) (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, University of Pennsylvania) (on file with Lillian Goldman Library, Yale Law 
School) (highlighting the concern that “uncontrolled contact made prisons into schools for 
crime,” where “new criminals were created out of the contact between innocents . . . and 
hardened criminals who were housed together”). 
16 Id. at 71-72 (describing how prisoners in Walnut Street Jail were “divided into groups 
based initially on their criminal history” and later “on their behavior while in the prison”). 
17 Id. at 81-82 (recounting the “lack of standardization in detail and type of information” 
found in descriptions of prisoners). 
18 Id. at 85. 
19 Id. at 86. 
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complexity of information gathered and the ease with which it could be 
retrieved, jail records remained of limited use in detecting recidivists.20  
The desire to identify criminally risky individuals, however, did not 
diminish over time; indeed, it grew.  In a society beset by massive social and 
economic changes driven by rapid industrialization and major increases in 
mobility, urbanization, population growth, and immigration, anonymity 
became the new American social norm.  No longer did neighbors necessarily 
know one another; America became, in the words of historian Michael 
Ignatieff, a “society of strangers.”21  In 1829, Gustave de Beaumont and Alexis 
de Tocqueville, visiting the country under the auspices of the French 
government to study American penal reforms, observed that in America 
“[n]othing is easier than to pass from one state to another, and it is the 
criminal’s interest to do so.”22  Without a reliable, centralized means of 
identification, they wrote, “the courts condemn, almost always, without 
knowing the true name of the criminal, and still less his previous life.”23 
 
II. POLICING IDENTITY  
The job of fulfilling this need fell to an emerging institutional entity: the 
police, which starting in the mid-1800s had become better organized and more 
professional and had assumed a more proactive and preventive role in securing 
public safety.24  A key ingredient in this ongoing transformation was the 
formulation of a reliable means of identifying and monitoring potential 
recidivists.  As Peter Becker observed, “stigma was no longer directly 
inscribed on the body of the perpetrator, but was rather administered in 
collections of data by the police.”25  
 
20 Id. at 103-05. 
21 Michael Ignatieff, State, Civil Society and Total Institutions: A Critique of Recent 
Social Histories of Punishment, in SOCIAL CONTROL AND THE STATE: HISTORICAL AND 
COMPARATIVE ESSAYS 87 (Stanley Cohen & Andrew Scull eds., 1983). 
22 GUSTAVE DE BEAUMONT & ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, ON THE PENITENTIARY SYSTEM IN 
THE UNITED STATES AND ITS APPLICATION IN FRANCE 101 (Francis Leiber trans., S. Ill. Univ. 
Press 1964) (1833).  Their concern stemmed from the vast differences between the highly 
migratory United States and the sedentary French populations, and the fact that French 
prison releasees were required to return to their village of origin until allowed by police to 
relocate.  Id. at 131 (explaining that while an American prisoner could move to another state 
after release and begin a new life, French prisoners were “condemned to live in the place 
where [their] first crime [was] officially known”).  
23  Id. at 101-02.  
24 For more on this transformation, especially evident in the nation’s urban areas, see 
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 27-30, 66-68 
(1993); ERIC H. MONKKONEN, POLICE IN URBAN AMERICA, 1860-1920, at 34-35 (1981); JOHN 
C. SCHNEIDER, DETROIT AND THE PROBLEM OF ORDER, 1830-1880, at 100-01, 119 (1980).   
25 Peter Becker, The Standardized Gaze: The Standardization of the Search Warrant in 
Nineteenth-Century Germany, in DOCUMENTING INDIVIDUAL IDENTITY: THE DEVELOPMENT 
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A. Early Methods  
1. “Spotting,” Photos, and Registries  
The challenge for police turned on discovery of an identification method 
that was both reliable and sufficiently user-friendly to be of practical utility.  In 
Europe, police had used standardized forms to identify suspected perpetrators 
since the early 1700s, and Prussian police were required to do so by decree in 
1828.26  By the mid- to late nineteenth century, American police had been 
assigned to specific geographic zones or “beats” in cities, and were trained to 
recall the faces and backgrounds of dangerous individuals prone to be in their 
areas.27  Officers – and the newly formed ranks of detectives – adopted various 
“spotting” techniques.  A select few were thought “human encyclopedias,” 
whose memory enabled them to mentally store the faces of criminals.28  
Soon, verbal descriptions and the mnemonic prowess of individual officers 
came to be supplemented by more formalized visual displays.  In 1851, Boston 
began conducting a weekly “show-up of rogues” for the benefit of police and 
locals,29 and New York City, building upon the early photographic innovations 
of the British and French in the 1840s,30 staged the first-known “rogues’ 
gallery” in 1857.31  Legal historian Howard Sprogle describes the rogues 
gallery used in 1880s Philadelphia as 
[a large walnut cabinet] which stands about five feet high, [inside of 
which] are ten walnut racks, which are pivoted at the side, and open like 
 
OF STATE PRACTICES IN THE MODERN WORLD, supra note 9, at 139, 155.  For more on the 
nineteenth century shift toward the objectification and rationalization of criminality, evident 
in efforts to identify and catalog criminal actors more generally, see George Pavlich, The 
Subjects of Criminal Identification, 11 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 171 (2009).    
26  Becker, supra note 25, at 144-45. 
27  See, e.g., SCHNEIDER, supra note 24, at 100 (discussing the evolving role of officers in 
Detroit).  
28  See HOWARD O. SPROGLE, THE PHILADELPHIA POLICE, PAST AND PRESENT 273, 653 
(1971).  In Philadelphia, a “secret service” of detectives, known only to the chief of police, 
was acquainted with the visages, backgrounds, and methods of “known criminals,” using 
their expertise to solve crimes and monitor transport hubs.  Id. at 117-18.   
29  ROGER LANE, POLICING THE CITY: BOSTON 1822-1885, at 66 (1967).  Upon their 
release, the seventy-six targets of the first showing were subjected to a “gauntlet of crowing 
citizens who tore their clothing and marked their backs with crosses in chalk.”  Id.  
30 Previously, in 1819, Germany and France experimented with predecessor 
technologies:  in Germany, portraits, and in France, use of the “physionotrace,” a device that 
permitted a person’s bodily shadow to be projected onto paper in silhouette form when the 
person was placed between the device and a light.  Becker, supra note 25, at 124, 154-56.  
Portraits, however, had the drawback of reflecting the subjective impression of the artist and 
required a talented artist to be available.  Silhouettes, while more mechanical, lacked 
sufficient detail to permit identification.  Id. at 156.  
31 JAMES F. RICHARDSON, THE NEW YORK POLICE:  COLONIAL TIMES TO 1901, at 122 
(1970).  Within a year of its creation, the gallery contained approximately 700 photos.  Id.  
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the leaves of a large photograph album.  The ten leaves will hold two 
thousand card photographs arranged in rows of ten pictures, or one 
hundred to each page, or two hundred to the leaf.  On the back of each 
card is the name of the individual, with points concerning his personality.  
Burglars, counterfeiters, forgers, highwaymen, pickpockets, . . . etc., are 
arranged together under appropriate headings.  An index is kept, giving 
the number of each portrait, with the name, age, height, marks and other 
particulars of the personal appearance of the criminal.32   
Initially limited to local offenders, Philadelphia’s gallery eventually contained 
images from other cities, and the public was invited to view the assortment.33 
The rogues-gallery method, however, suffered from an age-old 
administrative problem: the images were difficult to assemble in such a way as 
to ensure their subsequent retrieval.34  Moreover, the utility of the stored 
images was significantly undercut by the protean nature of individuals’ 
physical appearances, which could change either as a result of time and 
circumstance35 or overt effort to deceive.36  
In Europe, governments were experimenting with other, more systematic 
methods.  The French in 1850, for instance, instituted casiers judiciares, the 
brainchild of penal reformer Arnould Bonneville de Marsangy, which soon 
revolutionized criminal recordkeeping efforts.37  Instead of storing convict 
records solely in courts where convictions took place, Bonneville’s strategy 
required that a copy of each conviction and sentence be sent to a court located 
in an offender’s place of birth, or if such place was not known or the offender 
was foreign-born, to a central repository in Paris.38  With such information 
consolidated, it was thought that authorities could hold repeat offenders 
accountable and first-time offenders could benefit from lenience, while 
offenders in general would be better deterred from misdeeds.39  
Germany, by 1867, had its Meldewesen, which required all citizens to 
register with the police and to report all travel and changes of residence.40  
While the French system was static, reflecting only name and conviction-
related information, the German registry contained individuals’ names and 
 
32 SPROGLE, supra note 28, at 265-66.  
33 Id. at 117-18, 275. 
34 COLE, supra note 11, at 26. 
35 See id. at 48. 
36 See infra note 57 and accompanying text. 
37 André Normandeau, Pioneers in Criminology: Arnould Bonneville de Marsangy 
(1802-1894), 60 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 28, 30 (1969). 
38 PRISON ASS’N OF N.Y., 24TH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE 
PRISON 546, 553 (1869), available at http://books.google.com/books?id=KyUSAAAAYAA 
J&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false.   
39 Id. at 553-54. 
40 RAYMOND B. FOSDICK, EUROPEAN POLICE SYSTEMS 354-55 (1915).  
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addresses in each locality in which they lived or visited.41  The registry had a 
variety of purposes, including identifying children subject to compulsory 
vaccination and allowing police to apprehend criminal suspects.42  Writing in 
his seminal book, European Police Systems, American penal reformer 
Raymond Fosdick observed that “[n]o laws in Germany are more rigidly 
enforced than those relating to the Meldewesen.  Evasion is difficult and when 
detected is severely punished.”43  
In Berlin, which had maintained its own registration system since 1836, 
twelve million cards were on file, containing data on all persons who had at 
any time been in Berlin.44  Fosdick wrote that in Germany the Meldewesen 
constituted the “core of the detective department.  Through its agency the 
police can put their hands on any citizen when they want him.”45  The 
Meldewesen was also used by police to check the identities of “suspicious 
persons or persons inhabiting disorderly houses” to determine if they were 
wanted for crimes.46  With the system, Mathieu Deflem more recently wrote, 
“German police squads would raid hotels, lodging houses and public places, 
and check apprehended persons with information collected in the registration 
system.”47  
The Meldewesen system was complemented by the Steckbrief, a daily or 
weekly notice containing the names or descriptions of criminal suspects sought 
in Germany and elsewhere.48  The notice was used to apprehend fugitives and 
to check the identity of arrestees more generally to learn if they were otherwise 
wanted.49 
Fosdick had high praise for the two strategies, writing that they “together 
form[ed] an intricate network.”50  Police were trained to know the inhabitants 
of their beat and unknown individuals immediately attracted attention.  
Providing a false name was the only way for the system to be defeated, and 
even this was of little avail with German citizens, “who must satisfy the police 
as to their identity by means of military papers or their employment and 
insurance cards.  In cases of doubt, men are held pending further 
investigation.”51 
 
41 Id. 
42 Id.  
43 Id. at 352.  
44 Id. at 353.  The registration bureau had 200 employees who occupied 130 rooms.  Id.  
45 Id. at 356.  
46 Id. at 357-58.  
47 Mathieu Deflem, Surveillance and Criminal Statistics: Historical Foundations of 
Governmentality, 17 STUD. L. POL. & SOC’Y 149, 162 (1997). 
48 FOSDICK, supra note 40, at 358.  
49 Id.  
50 Id.  
51 Id.  The Nazis, coming to power several decades later, were greatly aided by the 
system.  See Robert M. W. Kempner, The German National Registration System as Means 
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Around the same time, the British were experimenting with registration 
systems of their own.  No longer able to jettison their criminal lawbreakers to 
faraway lands by means of transportation, the crown, by the mid-1800s, was 
acutely aware of the need to monitor and control them domestically.52  As legal 
historians Sir Leon Radzinowicz and Roger Hood observed, “[t]he perception 
of a mass of offenders at home, moving about and yet anonymous, fostered an 
escalating fear of a criminal or dangerous class and a resolve to do something 
drastic about it.”53  In response, the government enacted a series of laws 
allowing for the registration and monitoring of criminal offenders, as well as 
heightened sentences for recidivists.  
In 1869, the Habitual Criminals Bill required that all felons and certain 
misdemeanants register with police and provide a photo, and in 1877 the 
“Alphabetical Register of Habitual Criminals” was created.54  Upon 
recognizing that both methods were subject to defeat, such as by providing a 
false name or address,55 the British soon inaugurated the “Register of 
Distinctive Marks,” containing photos and information on bodily marks, as 
well as criminal modus operandi.56  The Register apportioned the body into 
nine parts, and what was deemed the most distinctive permanent mark, such as 
a scar or tattoo, determined where the individual’s name was placed in the 
register.  While better organized, the technique remained problematic because 
savvy individuals could alter the location and appearance of their marks; 
moreover, the register proved too cumbersome and labor-intensive to enjoy 
continued use, resulting in its eventual demise in the 1890s.57   
2. Anthropometry 
The foregoing efforts, despite their growing sophistication, highlighted the 
ongoing need for a method allowing for the reliable and systematic collection, 
storage, and retrieval of offender information.  A key innovation came with a 
regimen of bodily (anthropometric) identification offered by a French police 
 
of Police Control of Population, 36 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 362, 366, 378-81 (1946).  
The Reich Criminal Police kept separate card indices of “professional criminals,” gypsies, 
and wanted criminals, allowing for their ready identification and detention.  Id. at 382. 
52 Leon Radzinowicz & Roger Hood, Incapacitating the Habitual Criminal: The English 
Experience, 78 MICH. L. REV. 1305, 1308 (1980). 
53 Id.   
54 Id. at 1340-43, 1348. 
55 Id. at 1342-43, 1348-49.  This vulnerability was embodied in the behavior of one 
Lacenaire, described as a “professional criminal,” who “adopted false names, multiplied 
forgeries and disguises, and preyed actively on society.”  HAVELOCK ELLIS, THE CRIMINAL 
22-23 (2d ed. 1895). 
56 See Edmund R. Spearman, Known to the Police, 36 NINETEENTH CENTURY 356, 357 
(1894), reprinted in CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN ENGLAND: A SOURCEBOOK 256-57 (Andrew 
Barrett & Christopher Harrison eds., 1999). 
57 LEON RADZINOWICZ & ROGER HOOD, THE EMERGENCE OF PENAL POLICY IN VICTORIAN 
AND EDWARDIAN BRITAIN 261 (1990).  
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official, Alphonse Bertillon.  The ornate method depended on three data points: 
(1) body part dimensions, such as the head, finger, and ear; (2) descriptions of 
facial features; and (3) notations of “peculiar marks,” such as scars, 
birthmarks, and tattoos.58  Measurements were taken with calipers and other 
tools by specially trained clerks, and were complemented by full-face and 
profile photographs, as well as more subjective considerations such as 
complexion, demeanor, voice, and hair color, based on Bertillon’s specific 
“morphological vocabulary.”59 
The recordings consisted of the “signalment” phase; anthropometry’s 
appeal, however, also stemmed from its classification system.  Measurements 
taken by clerks were inscribed on index cards and assembled in large specially 
built cabinets with multiple rows and columns, each concerning a distinct body 
part.60  Cards were first separated by gender, then by head length (small, 
medium, or large), each subject to quantitative definition.  Operators then sub-
classified cards by head breadth; and divided again by middle finger length and 
other bodily measures; and divided yet again by eye color.  Each group was 
then placed in a separate file drawer and arrayed by ear length.61  With a new 
suspect in custody, operators would endeavor to match information taken from 
the suspect with the anthropometric information filed.62 
With anthropometry, officials could link individuals with quantified 
corporeal data, on replicable, systematically collected measures that were far 
more objective than those used in the past.  In addition, rather than having to 
rely on the personal knowledge or recollection of officials, the records were 
systematically organized, and hence accessible.63   
Bertillon’s regime derived from and reflected ongoing developments in the 
social sciences.64  Like evolutionary theorists Charles Darwin and Herbert 
 
58 ALPHONSE BERTILLON, INSTRUCTIONS FOR TAKING DESCRIPTIVE FOR THE 
IDENTIFICATION OF CRIMINALS AND OTHERS BY THE MEANS OF ANTHROPOMETRIC 
INDICATIONS 72 (Gallus Muller trans., AMS Press 1977) (1889). 
59 COLE, supra note 11, at 37. 
60 Id. at 45. 
61 Id.  
62 Martha Merrill Umphrey, “The Sun Has Been Too Quick for Them”: Criminal 
Portraiture and the Police in the Late Nineteenth Century, 16 STUD. L. POL. & SOC’Y 139, 
149 (1997).  
63 Not all were convinced of the superiority of the new regime, however, including New 
York City Police Lieutenant William Sheridan, “known and feared the world around among 
professional criminals as ‘The Man with the Camera Eye.’”  Duels with the Underworld, 
LEXINGTON HERALD, Oct. 23, 1910, at 4.  To Sheridan, “[n]othing . . . has been found to 
replace the human memory as a dependable agency for police detection and identification.”  
Id.     
64 See RONALD R. THOMAS, DETECTIVE FICTION AND THE RISE OF FORENSIC SCIENCE 223 
(1999) (stating that anthropometry was predicated on the idea that “the body betrays the 
truth about the criminal in the form of an automatic anatomical writing that is legible to the 
eyes of the trained expert”).    
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Spencer; eugenic theorist Sir Francis Galton; and criminal anthropologists such 
as Cesar Lombroso, who ascribed criminological significance to biological 
features, including skull sizes and shapes, tattoos, and the like,65 Bertillon 
sought predictability.  However, anthropometry emphasized the importance of 
painstaking individualized assessment, not “criminal types.”66  
Anthropometry was first adopted in the United States in 1887 by the Illinois 
State Penitentiary and by 1888 roughly a dozen large U.S. prisons used the 
system.67  In 1889, the federal government urged public support for creation of 
a centralized anthropometric identification bureau in the nation’s capital.68  
Singing the praises of anthropometry, an 1896 editorial in Indiana’s Fort 
Wayne News explained that the system was essential to the development of a 
“general system of criminal registration . . . .  Properly used[, the system] will 
be as nearly infallible as a system designed by man can be.”69   
While anthropometry never caught on nationwide with prison officials, due 
mainly to concern over the accuracy of its measurements,70 it received a 
warmer reception from police, desperate for help in their effort to monitor 
growing urban populations.71  In 1893, the year of the World Columbian 
 
65 On Lombroso’s work and the broader movement of which it was a part, see CHARLES 
COLBERT, A MEASURE OF PERFECTION: PHRENOLOGY AND THE FINE ARTS IN AMERICA 
(1997), and DAVID G. HORN, THE CRIMINAL BODY: LOMBROSO AND THE ANATOMY OF 
DEVIANCE (2003).  For discussion of the reasons behind Lombroso’s popularity in 
particular, see Nicole Hahn Rafter, Criminal Anthropology: Its Reception in the United 
States and the Nature of Its Appeal, in CRIMINALS AND THEIR SCIENTISTS: THE HISTORY OF 
CRIMINOLOGY IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 159-81 (Peter Becker & Richard F. Wetzell 
eds., 2006).   
66 The competing positions clashed in 1907 when Bertillon refuted Lombroso’s 
conclusion that the hands of a Parisian hostler made clear that he was a “born criminal,” 
when the man’s hands actually were misshapen as a result of his manual labor.  Bertillon 
and Lombroso at Odds over Palmistry, BALT. AM., Dec. 1, 1907, at 12.   
67 Sankar, supra note 15, at 196-97. 
68 Id. at 197.  
69 Editorial, Prison Reform V: The Incorrigible Criminal, FORT WAYNE NEWS, Dec. 30, 
1896, at 2.  If nothing else, the system seemed more tenable than the method once used in 
New York’s Sing Sing State Prison.  See Defense of the Bertillon System, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
20, 1896, at 3 (quoting a prison official as stating: “they build up around a man a frame 
something like a coffin, and if the man is again arrested they put him into the frame and see 
whether it fits; but it is not very practical, as the great number of boxes would become very 
cumbersome”). 
70 For instance, each measurement had to be consistently taken, which was difficult 
because the quality of training was uneven and because there were inaccuracies in 
translations of Bertillon’s work from its original French.  See COLE, supra note 11, at 147-
49.  In addition, despite the seeming quantitative objectivity of its measures, anthropometry 
depended on humans to carry out and record the measures, which could be transcribed 
improperly and subject to rounding inconsistencies.  Id. 
71 See WILBUR R. MILLER, COPS AND BOBBIES: POLICE AUTHORITY IN NEW YORK AND 
LONDON, 1830-1870, at 147 (1973) (“The development of preventive police had followed 
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Exposition, police in host city Chicago employed Bertillon’s system72 and the 
National Chiefs of Police Union (later to be renamed the International 
Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP)) unanimously endorsed its use.73  The 
group soon created a National Bureau for Criminal Identification (NBCI), in 
the hope of spawning a network of offices that would collect anthropometric 
information on criminal offenders and store it in a centralized office in the 
nation’s capital.74  
Although the NBCI never achieved universal use among the nation’s police 
departments, within a few years it stored 3000 index cards annually.  
Moreover, during the 1890s several large urban police departments, including 
those in New York and Washington, as well as the Pinkerton Detective 
Agency, instituted stand-alone anthropometric departments.75  As with 
corrections, however, the promise went unfulfilled.  Local police failed to 
follow prescribed methods, or otherwise erred in entering physical data, 
undercutting both the comprehensiveness and reliability of the system.76  
3. Fingerprinting  
Bertillon’s calipers held dominant sway until around 1910, when they faced 
competition from yet another criminal identification tool: fingerprint recording 
and analysis.  Having originated in seventh-century China, the first Western 
use of fingerprints in criminal justice is variously attributed to Englishmen 
William Herschel in the 1870s or Henry Faulds in 1880.77  The idea, however, 
did not achieve public notice until Sir Francis Galton, respected statistician, 
eugenicist, and cousin of Charles Darwin, refined and championed the idea at 
the turn of the century.78  In 1904, dazzling feats of fingerprint matches at the 
World’s Fair in St. Louis captivated and impressed huge crowds.79   
The system eventually developed, consisting of fingerprint pattern types 
containing “arches,” “loops,” and “whorls,” with distinct sub-classifications 
 
the growth of prison reform in America . . . .  [H]owever, the police functions of 
surveillance and apprehension outlived the prisons’ reformatory efforts and became the 
dominant means of coping with crime in the nineteenth century.”). 
72 Sankar, supra note 15, at 201-02.  
73 Id. at 202.  
74 IDENTIFICATION WANTED: DEVELOPMENT OF THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL IDENTIFICATION 
SYSTEM, 1893-1943, at 31-33 (Donald C. Dilworth ed., 1977).  The clarion call for greater 
national police cooperation in the sharing of information (in particular, photos) was issued 
before, in 1871, at the National Police Convention in St. Louis, but officials did not gather 
again to address such issues for another two decades.  SAMUEL WALKER, A CRITICAL 
HISTORY OF POLICE REFORM: THE EMERGENCE OF PROFESSIONALISM 40, 47-48 (1977). 
75 Sankar, supra note 15, at 204. 
76 See COLE, supra note 11, at 52. 
77 Id. at 65, 73.  Simon Cole notes that Albany, New York detective John Malloy may 
have used prints even earlier in the United States.  Id. at 120.   
78 Id. at 74. 
79 See id. at 137-38.  
  
1574 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:1561 
 
within each, was well received in America.  While for many years 
anthropometry and dactyloscopy (as fingerprint analysis came to be called) 
shared popularity with police departments using them in tandem,80 the latter 
soon emerged as the preferred identification method.  In 1911, the IACP 
endorsed fingerprinting and encouraged its use81 and by the 1930s 
fingerprinting was the nation’s criminal-identification method of choice.82   
Several reasons accounted for the speedy embrace of fingerprinting at the 
expense of anthropometry.  First, anthropometry, like early photographic 
technology that preceded it, failed to accommodate physical human change.  
Because the human body continued its physical growth into adulthood, 
anthropometry could not, for instance, accurately record juvenile offenders.  
Fingerprints, available in immutable form from birth, were not so limited.  
Second, anthropometry continued to be plagued by accuracy concerns.  
Justifying its switch from anthropometry to fingerprinting in 1910, for 
instance, the Boston Police Department asserted that “as the digits record 
themselves there are no inaccuracies.”83  Third, anthropometry was difficult to 
master, and despite Bertillon’s exhortations to the contrary, individual police 
departments took it upon themselves to add to, modify, and at times ignore 
bodily measures prescribed by the system.84  Fingerprinting, on the other hand, 
could be readily mastered, and was cheaper and quicker for clerks to 
administer.85  Finally, fingerprints themselves could be more easily stored and 
organized than the data in Bertillon’s complex system.  
State and local adoption of fingerprint analysis soon inspired interest from 
the federal government.  While the U.S. government for many years rebuffed 
state requests to store fingerprints, deeming crime control a local, not federal, 
responsibility, in time it assumed the institutional role with zeal.  Under the 
leadership of J. Edgar Hoover, the U.S. Department of Justice’s Bureau of 
Investigation, predecessor of the FBI, had over three million criminal offender 
 
80 Id. at 152. 
81 Sankar, supra note 15, at 213-14.  
82 This is not to say exclusive choice.  Bertillon measurements, combined with photos, 
continued to play a role in policing well into the 1900s.  In 1936, for instance, concerned 
that an influx of anonymous criminals might prey on visitors for the Democratic Party 
Convention in the city, Philadelphia police amassed photographs of some 10,000 
pickpockets, hotel thieves, swindlers, and ex-convicts, along with their Bertillon 
measurements, and shared information on the “undesirables” with hotel detectives and floor 
managers.  Philadelphia Dons Convention Dress, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 1936, at 8; Photos of 
10,000 Crooks Gathered for Convention, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 1936, at 2. 
83 COLE, supra note 11, at 165.  
84 See supra note 70 and accompanying text.  
85 COLE, supra note 11, at 159.  According to Simon Cole, the anthropometric 
measurement of females posed particular challenges, inter alia, due to their bouffant hair 
styles that threw off height measures and distinctive marks possibly located in body areas 
that discouraged investigation by the typically male diagnosticians.  Id. at 154. 
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fingerprints on file in 1932, with prints provided by 4,913 law enforcement 
agencies nationwide.86 
In later years, the utility of fingerprints extended beyond identity 
verification.87  Loops and whorls contained in prints could be compared to 
those found at crime scenes, resulting in the solution of unsolved crimes.  This 
new forensic-investigative role was soon greatly enhanced by technological 
advances, especially the nationwide Automated Fingerprint Identification 
System in the 1980s, and the Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification 
System (IAFIS) in the 1990s, permitting automated access to and analysis of 
digitally stored prints.88  Even if a print failed to result in immediate solution of 
a crime, it could, when stored, be of potential future investigative value.  Also, 
in the late 1990s, a revamped version of the National Criminal Information 
Center (NCIC), first instituted in the late 1960s, came on line.  The more 
sophisticated system radically enlarged the capacity for the linking of stored 
information across disparate databases.89  
B. Modern Methods   
Until the 1980s, fingerprints remained the principal form of identity 
evidence.  In the past few decades, however, remarkable scientific and 
technological advances have afforded police an array of new technologies, 
giving rise to what one writer aptly called the “digitally efficient investigative 
state.”90  This part provides a brief overview of three primary techniques, each 
concerning biometric measurements.91  
 
86 Federal Crime Registry Results in 236 Arrests, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 12, 1932, at A12.  
By mid-1956, the FBI had well over 141 million fingerprints on file.  DON WHITEHEAD, THE 
FBI STORY: A REPORT TO THE PEOPLE 139 (1956). 
87 See generally COLE, supra note 11, at 168-90.   
88 See Erin Murphy, Databases, Doctrine and Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 37 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 803, 806-08 (2010).  At present, the IAFIS system constitutes the 
largest criminal identification database in the world.  Integrated Automated Fingerprint 
Identification System, FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/about-
us/cjis/fingerprints_biometrics/iafis/iafis (last visited Oct. 10, 2012).  
89 Murphy, supra note 88, at 808-09 (describing how the NCIC folds into the National 
Instant Criminal Background Check System, the Convicted Sexual Offender Registry, and 
the Convicted Persons on Supervised Release database).  
90 Stephen Rushin, The Judicial Response to Mass Police Surveillance, 2 U. ILL. J.L. 
TECH. & POL’Y 281, 284-85 (2011). 
91 “Biometrics” refers either to biological or physiological characteristics usable for 
automatic recognition of individuals on the basis of such characteristics.  See NAT’L SCI. & 
TECH. COUNCIL, PRIVACY & BIOMETRICS: BUILDING A CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATION 4 (2006), 
available at http://www.biometrics.gov/Documents/privacy.pdf.  For more in-depth 
treatment of the techniques described, as well as many other new biometric methods (e.g., 
voice, vein pattern, or hand), see BIOMETRIC SYSTEMS: TECHNOLOGY, DESIGN AND 
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION (James Wayman et al. eds., 2005); JOHN D. WOODWARD, JR. ET 
AL., BIOMETRICS: A LOOK AT FACIAL RECOGNITION 3 (2003).  The FBI’s “Next Generation 
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1. Iris and Retina Recognition 
One identification method concerns the human eye, the iris and retina in 
particular.  Iris recognition records the pigmented portion on the front of the 
eye surrounding the pupil, which contains features that serve as unique 
identifiers.92  The technique requires use of a high-resolution near-infrared 
camera that captures an image of the iris that is stored in a database.  The 
image can be quickly secured by police, in two to three seconds, and captured 
from up to three feet away (it is expected, however, that significantly greater 
distances will soon be possible).93  While current scanning technology requires 
that the subject be stationary and look straight into the camera, this does not 
present a major obstacle when police have stopped or arrested a subject, as 
commonly occurs on street patrol.   
Retina recognition is also based on a captured ocular image.94  Here, the 
biometric identifier is located in the posterior of the eye, focusing on the 
biologically unique complex of capillaries supplying the retina with blood.  A 
retinal image is taken by subjecting the eye to a beam of near infrared light, 
with the beam tracing the retina’s pattern, which is then converted into code 
and stored in a database.95  The retina affords a highly accurate basis for 
identification, so much so that even identical twins do not share a similar 
pattern.96  Also, the retina typically remains unaltered until death, absent 
diabetes, glaucoma, or particular retinal degenerative disorders.97  However, 
because at present the image must be taken very close to the eye (much like 
when peering into a microscope),98 the retina enjoys less common 
identification use than the iris. 
 
Identification” system is leading the federal government’s advances in integrating the 
various biometric databases.  Next Generation Identification, FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION, 
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/fingerprints_biometrics/ngi (last visited Aug. 20, 2011). 
92 See generally John Daugman, Iris Recognition, 89 AM. SCIENTIST 326 (2001).  The 
concept of using the iris for recognition dates back to 1936, yet the technique did not enjoy 
significant use until the late 1980s and 1990s with the development of algorithms permitting 
automatic recognition.  See NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, BIOMETRICS OVERVIEW 3 (2006), 
available at http://www.biometrics.gov/Documents/BioOverview.pdf. 
93 Kathy Harman-Stokes, Ubiquitous Biometrics, FUTURE OF PRIVACY FORUM (Feb. 10, 
2010), http://www.futureofprivacy.org/2010/02/10/ubiquitous-biometrics.   
94 See generally JOHN D. WOODWARD, JR. ET AL., ARMY BIOMETRIC APPLICATIONS: 
IDENTIFYING AND ADDRESSING SOCIOCULTURAL CONCERNS 17 (2001).  
95 See Retinography, MED. DISCOVERIES, http://www.discoveriesinmedicine.com/Ra-
Thy/Retinography.html (last visited Aug. 29, 2012).   
96 Ravi Das, Retinal Recognition: Biometric Technology in Practice, KEESING J. 
DOCUMENTS & IDENTITY, no. 22, 2007, at 11.  
97 Id. at 14. 
98 Id.  
  
2012] POLICING IDENTITY 1577 
 
2. Facial Recognition  
With facial recognition, a photograph of the subject’s face is taken or 
distilled from a video surveillance image.99  The image is then processed and 
converted into a digital template based on facial geometry, which is stored in a 
database, searchable by algorithm.100  While gaining in significant popularity 
with governments,101 the method currently suffers from two main 
shortcomings: first, it has a lower match accuracy rate compared to other new 
biometric methods; second, accuracy can be further reduced because of poor 
lighting conditions, glare, and other imaging challenges.102 
3. DNA Sampling  
Finally, and most important, police can secure and analyze DNA, which is 
contained in the bodily cells of all humans.103  DNA is comprised of inherited 
genetic material containing sequences of nucleotides that are unique to each 
person (except for identical twins).  Even small amounts of blood, saliva, hair, 
or other bodily elements suffice for samples, which can be obtained directly 
(by blood draw or buccal cheek swab) or by “shedding” (such as leaving saliva 
on a drink cup).104  DNA sample information is stored in databases maintained 
by states, localities, and the federal government, and the respective databases 
have been merged into the FBI’s Combined DNA Index System (CODIS).  
CODIS contains over ten million DNA profiles105 and allows for a centralized 
 
99 See LUCAS D. INTRONA & HELEN NISSENBAUM, CTR. FOR CATASTROPHE PREPAREDNESS 
& RESPONSE, FACIAL RECOGNITION TECHNOLOGY: A SURVEY OF POLICY AND 
IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES 11 (2009), available at http://www.nyu.edu/ccpr/pubs/Niss_04.08. 
09.pdf. 
100 Id. at 16. 
101 See Ryan Gallagher, FBI to Give Facial Recognition Software to Law-Enforcement 
Agencies, SLATE (Aug. 23, 2012), http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2012/08/23/ 
universal_face_workstation_fbi_to_give_facial_recognition_software_to_law_enforcement_
.html.  
102 INTRONA & NISSENBAUM, supra note 99, at 21-38; see also P. Jonathan Phillips et al., 
An Introduction to the Good, the Bad, & the Ugly Face Recognition Challenge Problem 
(2010), available at http://www.nist.gov/itl/iad/ig/upload/05771424.pdf (explaining a mere 
fifteen percent accuracy for facial images that are “difficult to match”). 
103 For a helpful primer on the nature and use of DNA, see generally DNA AND THE 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: THE TECHNOLOGY OF JUSTICE (David Lazer ed., 2004).  
104 Even though DNA sampling requires extraction of a tangible physical sample, and not 
an impression or image, as is the case of biometric identifiers more generally, DNA 
sampling typically is regarded as a biometric identifier inasmuch as it is based on a 
physiological characteristic.  See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., 
BIOMETRIC RECOGNITION: CHALLENGE AND OPPORTUNITIES 94 (Joseph Pato & Lynette 
Millett eds., 2010), available at http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=12720#toc.   
105 See CODIS-NDIS Statistics, FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/about-
us/lab/codis/ndis-statistics (last visited Sept. 5, 2011). 
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repository for uploaded samples and integrated searches for genetic matches.106  
Police can use the information in a variety of ways, including by establishing a 
link between a crime scene sample and a sample provider (known as a “cold 
hit”).  Most recently, police have conducted investigative scans of DNA 
databases for “familial” or “kinship” matches, which look for partial matches 
in order to find possible relatives of the genetic source rather than seeking 
exact matches.107  
 
* * * 
 
As the foregoing highlights, over the years police have eagerly embraced 
newly available technologies to increase their criminal identification 
capabilities.  With policing becoming more proactive in nature, identity 
evidence came to play an increasingly central role, first allowing for the 
identification of detained individuals, and later allowing for the forensic 
investigation of past and future criminality.  The next section examines how 
identity evidence has been addressed by the courts during this evolution.  
III. IDENTITY EVIDENCE IN THE COURTS  
Despite its increasing importance over time, identity evidence has received 
inconsistent and sporadic attention from the courts.  While early courts took a 
relatively keen interest in identification methods by imposing limits, over time 
this scrutiny abated, giving way to the blasé acceptance of today.  This section 
first provides an overview of initial judicial treatment of identity evidence and 
then examines how modern courts are addressing two fundamentally important 
questions.  First, whether and how the collection, retention, and use of identity 
evidence – DNA in particular – should be limited when secured as a result of 
lawful police detention; second, whether, when police unlawfully secure 
identity evidence and use it to facilitate prosecutions, the exclusionary rule 
should apply.   
A. Early Era  
While no evidence apparently exists of judicial reactions to spotting and 
similar memory-based identification techniques, courts did weigh in on police 
use of photographs, anthropometry, and fingerprints.  Consistent with public 
concern and anxiety over unfettered police resort to the methods,108 courts very 
 
106 See Erin Murphy, The New Forensics: Criminal Justice, False Certainty, and the 
Second Generation of Scientific Evidence, 95 CAL. L. REV. 721, 739-40 (2007) (describing 
how the federal government and states use DNA matches to identify individuals on the basis 
of “cold hits”). 
107 See generally Natalie Ram, Fortuity and Forensic Familial Identification, 63 STAN. 
L. REV. 751 (2011).  
108 See, e.g., COLE, supra note 11, at 157 (recounting public hostility in New York City 
in 1916 spawned by expanded fingerprinting of minor offense arrestees permanently 
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often imposed limits, especially vis-à-vis persons arrested for but not convicted 
of offenses.109  As Berkeley Law Professor A.M. Kidd wrote in 1919, courts 
did not “sanction the common practice of ‘mugging’ every suspect whose 
picture and measurements the police would like to have.  Nor d[id the courts] 
sustain the right to retain the prints and measurements after acquittal.”110  
Professor Kidd, upon surveying the caselaw, including a handful of decisions 
adopting a more generous stance,111 emphasized that even such cases went “no 
further than to permit the taking of photographs and measurements of persons 
suspected of serious offenses, for the purpose of identification.”112  Clearly a 
proponent of affording police greater authority, Professor Kidd added: 
In other words, that army of vagrants, hop-heads and degenerates in 
whose ranks are often to be found the most dangerous criminals, cannot 
[under current law] be fingerprinted in order to fasten on them crimes of 
which they may have been guilty in other places, nor can their records be 
retained to aid in future apprehension.113 
The 1907 New York decision Gow v. Bingham114 exemplified this judicial 
reluctance.  There the defendant was charged with grand larceny and forgery, 
but never convicted, and sued to compel destruction of his photo, 
measurements, and fingerprints.  The Gow court, interpreting a New York 
 
“branded as criminals”); John Watkins, “Mugging” Innocent Persons Under Arrest: Lights 
and Shadows of a System Whose Abuse Has Shaken New York’s Police from Top to Bottom, 
OREGONIAN (Portland), July 25, 1909, at 4.  At the same time, the public and courts alike 
were decidedly impressed by the new “scientific” methods.  See, e.g., Keeping Track of the 
Criminal by His Finger Prints: The Wonderful Art, Long Used in China, Rapidly Being 
Adopted by the Police of This Country, with the New York Force Leading, N.Y. TIMES, July 
30, 1911 (Magazine), at 12 (“[T]he finger-print system will remain the great science of 
identification long after all burglars have learned to go gloved in midsummer.”).  
109 See, e.g., People v. Hevern, 215 N.Y.S. 412, 418 (N.Y. Mag. Ct. 1926) (deeming 
“compulsory finger printing before conviction [] an unlawful encroachment upon person, in 
violation of the state and Federal Constitutions”); see also JOSEPH M. DEUEL, What There Is 
in Finger-Prints, in FINGER-PRINTS 3, 10 (1917) (relaying from author’s experience as a 
New York City Magistrate that “[t]here must be an arrest . . . and a plea of guilty or a 
conviction on competent evidence before there can be finger-printing; there can be none on 
an acquittal”); Finger-Printing, EVENING WORLD DAILY MAG. (New York), Dec. 19, 1916, 
at 16 (lauding refusal of several magistrates to engage in “routine” fingerprinting of persons 
arrested for petty offenses, condemning such collection as “preposterous [and] barbarous”).   
110 A.M. Kidd, The Right to Take Fingerprints, Measurements and Photographs, 8 CAL. 
L. REV. 25, 32 (1919).  
111 Id. at 30-32 (citing Shaffer v. United States, 24 App. D.C. 417 (1904); Mabry v. 
Kettering, 122 S.W. 115 (Ark. 1909); Downs v. Swann, 73 A. 653 (Md. 1909)).  
112 Id. at 32.  
113 Id.; see also id. at 35 (“[P]olice officials take a risk in the photographing, measuring 
and finger-printing regularly done in most departments.”).     
114 107 N.Y.S. 1011 (N.Y. 1907). 
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statute proscribing the taking of identification measurements before conviction, 
unequivocally condemned the departmental practice, stating: 
The officers of the police department are purely executive and 
administrative officers.  The act of determining whether the liberty of a 
citizen shall be infringed . . . belongs solely to the Legislature. . . .  To 
sustain a mere rule of the police department under such circumstances 
would be to confer upon the officials of that department not only 
executive, but legislative and judicial powers . . . .  The acts of the police 
department here criticized were not only a gross outrage, not only 
perfectly lawless, but they were criminal in character.115  
Early courts also made clear their concern over the long-term stigmatizing 
effect of identity evidence, especially evidence collected from persons featured 
in rogues galleries but not convicted of crimes.116  In such situations, it was not 
uncommon for individuals to win injunctive relief allowing for the destruction 
or return of photographic plates in the possession of police.117   
Starting in the 1930s, however, courts began evincing a less critical and 
more accepting view.  Most notably, in United States v. Kelly118 the Second 
Circuit rejected a challenge to the use of identity evidence, based on the 
absence of statutory authority to extract prints, brought by a defendant facing 
misdemeanor prosecution under the National Prohibition Act.  The court 
downplayed the “indignity” experienced by Kelly and backed police efforts in 
“ascertaining whether a defendant has been previously convicted, so that the 
prior conviction can be pleaded as required in . . . the National Prohibition 
Act.”119  Identity verification, the court stressed, was “especially important in a 
time when increased population and vast aggregations of people in urban 
centers have rendered the notoriety of the individual in the community no 
 
115 Id. at 1017-18; see also, e.g., State v. Baldwin, 297 S.W. 10, 18-19 (Mo. 1927) 
(explaining that a 1919 state law required that “any person convicted of a felony, whose 
sentence has not been reversed, shall be subject to all the things (by way of identification) 
allowed by the Bertillon system”).   
116 See, e.g., Downs v. Swann, 73 A. 653, 655 (Md. 1909) (refusing to “countenance the 
placing in the rogues’ gallery of the photograph of any person, not an habitual criminal, who 
has been arrested but not convicted, on a criminal charge, or the publication under those 
circumstances of his Bertillon record”); Brokaw’s Caretaker Held on Two Charges, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 13, 1905, at 8 (quoting a magistrate: “‘I do not approve of photographing a man 
for the Rogue’s Gallery until after he is convicted.’ . . .  ‘I have always been opposed to the 
idea.  Once a man’s picture is in the Rogue’s Gallery it is difficult for him get it out.’”).   
117 See, e.g., Itzkovitch v. Whitaker, 42 So. 228, 229 (La. 1906) (ordering return of  
photo plate and destruction of all fingerprints and measurements in police department’s 
possession and stating that continued exhibition would be an unjust “permanent proof of 
dishonesty”). 
118 55 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1932).  
119 Id. at 70.  
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longer a ready means of identification.”120  In so holding, however, the court 
emphasized that the long-term effect of the policy was limited because 
identification data had to be destroyed or surrendered to the individual in the 
event the charge was dismissed or an acquittal occurred.121  
Kelly marked an important shift, signaling the judiciary’s greater willingness 
to endorse the collection and use of identity evidence, fingerprints in particular, 
at the pre-conviction stage.  Consistent with earlier decisions and then-current 
practice, however, such use had administrative rather than investigative ends, 
seeking to discern individuals with criminal histories and thereby defeat 
criminal anonymity.122  As discussed next, this circumscribed view would 
change in coming years, with Kelly itself playing a critical role.  
B. Modern Era  
As recounted earlier, the mid- to late twentieth century experienced a 
remarkable renaissance in identification technology, with new biometric 
measures such as DNA and integrated multimodal databases providing law 
enforcement unprecedented capacity to both verify individual identity and 
investigate criminal activity.  Nevertheless, as this section makes clear, the 
courts have faltered in their response to these changes. 
1. Collection, Storage, and Use of DNA  
Like fingerprinting, DNA sampling has over the years targeted an 
increasingly broad scope of individuals.  Initially, convicted sex offenders 
were targeted, and then all convicted felons,123 expansions soon garnering 
approval from the courts.124  More recently, attention has turned to state and 
 
120 Id. at 69.  
121 Id. at 71.  
122 See Annotation, Right to Take Finger Prints and Photographs of Accused Before 
Trial, or to Retain Same in Police Record After Acquittal or Discharge of Accused, 83 
A.L.R. 127 (1933) (“This system in criminal law has two main purposes.  The first is the 
identification of an accused as the person who committed the crime with which he is 
charged, and the second is the identification of an accused as the same person who has been 
charged with, or convicted of, other crimes.”); Comment, Excluding from Evidence 
Fingerprints Taken After an Unlawful Arrest, 69 YALE L.J. 432, 438 n.30 (1960) (“In 
addition to establishing identity at the time of arrest, fingerprints are useful in aiding the 
apprehension of escaped prisoners, and in ascertaining whether the defendant has been 
previously convicted . . . .” (citing United States v. Kelly, 55 F.2d 67, 70 (2d Cir. 1932))); 
Note, Methods of Scientific Crime Detection as Infringements of Personal Rights, 44 HARV. 
L. REV. 842, 843 n.9 (1931) (noting judicial view of photos and prints as being “entirely 
proper” with respect to identity verification but acknowledging that “[t]he propriety of other 
uses remains open to conjecture”). 
123 Tracey Maclin, Is Obtaining an Arrestee’s DNA a Valid Special Needs Search Under 
the Fourth Amendment? What Should (and Will) the Supreme Court Do?, 33 J.L. MED. & 
ETHICS 102, 102 (2005).  
124 See, e.g., United States v. Stewart, 532 F.3d 32, 36-37 (1st Cir. 2008); United States 
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federal laws that allow police to collect and analyze DNA evidence of persons 
not yet convicted of crimes, including mere arrestees.  
The Third Circuit’s en banc decision in United States v. Mitchell125 marks 
the most significant treatment of the issue to date.  In Mitchell, the government 
sought to compel collection of a DNA sample from a defendant indicted on a 
felony drug charge, based on federal law allowing samples to be taken from 
“individuals arrested, facing charges, or convicted.”126  The court rejected 
Mitchell’s assertion that the collection and analysis of the sample, undertaken 
without a search warrant, constituted an unreasonable suspicionless search 
under the Fourth Amendment.127  
Employing the totality of the circumstances test used by most courts to 
assess such claims, the Third Circuit acknowledged that the DNA sample 
collection constituted a search, but deemed it not an especially intrusive one 
given available collection methods such as buccal swabbing.128  Moreover, the 
court downplayed the risk that sensitive personal and medical information 
contained in a DNA sample might be misused, given government safeguards in 
place.129  
The Mitchell court next addressed a matter of core interest to the discussion 
here – the functional role of DNA evidence in establishing individual identity 
and “the degree to which an individual has an expectation of privacy in his or 
her own identity.”130  The court began by analogizing DNA sampling to 
fingerprinting, “part of a routine booking process.”131  Citing the Second 
Circuit’s 1932 decision in United States v. Kelly as provenance for what it 
considered the historically routine fingerprinting of arrestees,132 the Mitchell 
court stated that DNA analysis served “solely as an accurate, unique, 
 
v. Kriesel, 508 F.3d 941, 950 (9th Cir. 2007); Banks v. United States, 490 F.3d 1178, 1193 
(10th Cir. 2007); Bina Ghanaat, Comment, Technology and Privacy: The Need for an 
Appropriate Mode of Analysis in the Debate over the Federal DNA Act, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 1315, 1332-36 (2009) (surveying caselaw).  
125 652 F.3d 387 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1741 (2012).    
126 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(a)(1)(A) (2006); see also 28 C.F.R. § 28.12 (2012) (“[A]ny 
agency of the United States that arrests or detains individuals . . . shall collect DNA samples 
from individuals who are arrested, facing charges, or convicted . . . .”). 
127 See Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 416 (“[G]iven arrestees’ and pretrial detainees’ diminished 
expectations of privacy in their identities and the Government’s legitimate interests in the 
collection of DNA from these individuals, we conclude that  such collection is reasonable 
and does not violate the Fourth Amendment.”). 
128 Id. at 406-07.   
129 Id. at 407-09. 
130 Id. at 410.  
131 Id.   
132 Id. at 410-11 (citing United States v. Kelly, 55 F.2d 67, 68 (2d Cir. 1932)).   
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identifying marker – in other words, as fingerprints for the twenty-first 
century.”133  
Turning to the government’s interest in collecting DNA, the court shifted 
emphasis in an important way.  The court readily accepted a merged 
government interest in DNA, which can both verify identity and aid in 
investigation of past and future crimes.134  The court drove the point home by 
asserting that there exist 
two components to a person’s identity: “who that person is (the person’s 
name, date of birth, etc.) and what that person has done (whether the 
individual has a criminal record, whether he is the same person who 
committed an as-yet unsolved crime across town, etc.).” . . .  The second 
component – what a person has done – has important pretrial 
ramifications.  Running an arrestee’s DNA profile through CODIS could 
reveal matches to crime-scene samples from unsolved cases.135 
The Mitchell court’s analysis is troubling for several reasons.  First, like 
other courts,136 its invocation of the historical experience with pre-conviction 
collection, retention, and use of fingerprints, characterized as “routine,” is well 
off the mark.  As noted earlier, prints were, as a general rule, collected and 
stored only in the event of conviction, with the Second Circuit’s decision in 
Kelly marking a shift in judicial attitude.137  
Second, by blurring the verification and investigative functions of identity 
evidence, the Mitchell court again took undue liberty with the historical record.  
Kelly, as the court recognized, was predicated on the need to verify identity,138 
and was decided well before the forensic investigative heyday of prints, 
allowing for digitized matches to “latent” prints found at a crime scene or 
stored in databases.139  If any historical inference were to be drawn, it would be 
 
133 Id. at 410; see also id. at 413 (“DNA profiling is simply a more precise method of 
ascertaining identity and is thus akin to fingerprinting, which has long been accepted as part 
of routine booking procedures.”).   
134 See id. at 414 (“To the extent that DNA profiling assists the Government in accurate 
criminal investigations and prosecutions (both of which are dependent on accurately 
identifying the suspect), it is in the Government’s interest to have this information as soon 
as possible.”).  
135 Id. (quoting Haskell v. Brown, 677 F. Supp. 2d 1187, 1199 (N.D. Cal. 2009)). 
136 See, e.g., Anderson v. Commonwealth, 650 S.E.2d 702, 706 (Va. 2007) (terming 
collection and retention of fingerprints historically “routine”). 
137 See supra notes 108-122 and accompanying text.  
138 Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 411 (stating that the Second Circuit “emphasized that 
fingerprinting arrestees is for the purpose of identification”).  
139 See COLE, supra note 11, at 250-58 (surveying the revolutionary effect 
computerization and digitization had on the investigative power of fingerprints).  This is not 
to say, however, that the forensic capability of fingerprints went unrecognized early on.  As 
Professor Cole has observed, in 1902 Alphonse Bertillon searched his collection of 
anthropometric data, including fingerprints, and found a match with a bloody print left on a 
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that early courts would be wary of condoning anything more than identity 
verification, based on a database consisting of convicted individuals.140 
Finally, and critically important, the court ignored critical developments 
occurring since Kelly by accepting as an article of faith the constitutionality of 
unfettered collection, storage, and use of arrestee identity data.  Most obvious, 
Kelly predated the radical transformation and growth of Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence commencing in the 1960s.141  As the Mitchell majority itself was 
obliged to acknowledge, the constitutional propriety of identity verification 
methods at the pre-conviction stage has always merely been “assume[d].”142  
Use of Kelly as a fulcrum to justify application of identity methods as an open-
ended investigative device without doctrinal foundation is thus especially 
problematic.143 
Moreover, the Mitchell majority failed to give effect to several other broader 
developments of critical importance, affecting policing more generally.  One 
development concerns a shift in police modus operandi.  As noted, over time 
policing has become increasingly proactive, a tendency of late particularly 
manifest in the enforcement of laws concerning low-level offenses.  In the 
past, officers would enforce such laws to serve immediate social control goals, 
often to quell anxiety felt by urban elites.144  Starting in the 1990s, however, 
champions of “quality of life” and “zero tolerance” policing urged that 
detention of petty offenders could achieve broader crime control benefits 
 
piece of glass collected at a murder scene.  Id. at 169-71. 
140 See supra notes 108-122 and accompanying text. 
141 See United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 874 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (Kozinski, 
C.J., dissenting) (“Because the great expansion in fingerprinting came before the modern era 
of the Fourth Amendment[,] . . . it proceeded unchecked by any judicial balancing against 
the personal right to privacy.”).  Indeed, case law from the late 1960s was at pains to 
distinguish the identity verification role of fingerprinting from its investigative use.  See, 
e.g., United States v. Laub Baking Co., 283 F. Supp. 217, 222-25 (N.D. Ohio 1968).  
142 Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 410 n.20 (citing as examples Napolitano v. United States, 340 
F.2d 313 (1st Cir. 1965), Smith v. United States, 324 F.2d 879 (D.C. Cir. 1963), and United 
States v. Iacullo, 226 F.2d 788 (7th Cir. 1955)).  Nevertheless, the Mitchell majority, 
quoting one of the very cases it identified in support of this conclusion, confidently 
concluded: “It is ‘elementary’ that blanket fingerprinting of individuals who have been 
lawfully arrested or charged with a crime does not run afoul of the Fourth Amendment.” Id. 
at 411 (quoting Smith, 324 F.2d at 882).   
143 The precedential vacuum has been used by at least one court, oddly enough, as a basis 
to justify investigative use of identity.  See Haskell v. Brown, 677 F. Supp. 2d 1187, 1199 
(N.D. Cal. 2009) (“Plaintiffs could point the Court to no case holding that once an 
individual has been identified through his fingerprints, the government was barred from 
running those same fingerprints against crime scene samples for investigative purposes . . . 
.”), aff’d, 669 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2012), reh’g and en banc granted, 686 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 
2012).  
144 See, e.g., MONKKONEN, supra note 24, at 103-08 (discussing nineteenth century New 
York City policing); SCHNEIDER, supra note 24, at 106-08 (discussing nineteenth century 
Detroit policing). 
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because such offenders could be involved in more serious criminal activity.145 
“Broken windows” policing, also popular during the era, targeted petty 
offenders for arrest on the premise that low-level offenses, such as loitering 
and graffiti vandalism, contributed to more general neighborhood disorder 
conducive to criminality.146  Such arrests, aside from holding promise for 
immediate crime abatement, allow police to search individuals and their 
possessions, leading to possible discovery of evidence of more serious criminal 
activity, augmenting the menu of factors favoring police resort to arrests.147   
Around this time, the Supreme Court weighed in with a series of decisions 
explicitly affording police expansive authority to undertake stops and arrests 
without warrants.  First, the Court held that police can seize individuals for an 
offense that is actually a mere pretext to pursue suspicion of other, more 
serious criminal activity.148  Then, in Atwater v. City of Lago Vista,149 a five-
member majority held that police, lacking a warrant, can arrest an individual 
for any public offense, no matter how minor, if probable cause exists that it 
occurred.150  The end result of these decisions, and others in recent years,151 
has been a massive increase in the discretionary authority of police to seize 
individuals, affording attendant growth in the identity evidence that police can 
collect, store, and use.  
 
145 See Wayne A. Logan, Policing in an Intolerant Society, 35 CRIM. L. BULL. 334, 334-
36 (1999).  
146 See Debra Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public Places: 
Courts, Communities, and the New Policing, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 551, 580 (1997).   
147 See Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the Equitable Decision Not 
to Prosecute, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1655, 1694-95 (2010) (discussing, inter alia, purported 
existence of arrest quotas, monetary benefits associated with forfeiture and arrests, and 
training opportunities for new recruits).  For the classic treatment of the manifold reasons 
motivating police to arrest, including without evidence of wrongdoing and with the intent to 
eventually release, see WAYNE R. LAFAVE, ARREST: THE DECISION TO TAKE A SUSPECT INTO 
CUSTODY 437-66 (Frank J. Remington ed., 1965).  For a more recent portrait of police resort 
to arrest for low-level offenses as a street control method, see PETER MOSKOS, COP IN THE 
HOOD: MY YEAR POLICING BALTIMORE’S EASTERN DISTRICT 114-20 (2008). 
148 See Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 771 (2001) (deeming irrelevant police 
subjective motivation for an arrest supported by probable cause); Whren v. United States, 
517 U.S. 806, 812 (1996) (concluding the same with respect to vehicle stops).  
149 532 U.S. 318 (2001).  
150 Id. at 354 (“If an officer has probable cause to believe that an individual has 
committed even a very minor criminal offense in his presence, he may, without violating the 
Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender.”). 
151 See, e.g., Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 176-78 (2008) (holding that police can 
violate procedural limits imposed on their authority to arrest for minor offenses); Ohio v. 
Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39-40 (1996) (holding that police need not inform individuals that a 
lawful seizure has concluded, allowing for extended questioning and securing of consent). 
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Given the foregoing, the Mitchell court’s blurring of the verification and 
investigative functions of identity evidence becomes especially problematic.152  
Even presuming that a unilateral police finding of probable cause diminishes 
an expectation of privacy in one’s identity (who one is),153 an entirely different 
question is presented by identifying information (revealing what one might 
have done or perhaps will do).154  The latter question – the 
forensic/investigative one – has in modern times been governed by Fourth 
Amendment doctrine.  With no limit on the pre-conviction collection of 
identity evidence, police will, as urged by advocates,155 be free to 
exponentially populate DNA databases.  While at present governments mainly 
target persons arrested for suspected commission of felonies,156 there have 
been frequent calls to expand collection efforts to all arrestees157 and a handful 
of states already require that DNA be extracted from suspected 
misdemeanants.158  The continued expansion in the target population of DNA 
 
152 Similarly heedless, a Ninth Circuit panel, relying heavily on Mitchell, recently 
merged the two distinct functions in upholding a California law requiring DNA collection of 
felony arrestees.  See Haskell v. Harris, 669 F.3d 1049, 1065 (9th Cir. 2012).  It did so over 
a lengthy dissent by Judge William Fletcher highlighting the law’s explicit purpose of 
facilitating identity verification, which the majority generously defined to encompass 
investigative functions.  Id. at 1074 (Fletcher, J., dissenting).  
153 Probable cause is itself an ephemeral standard that is relatively easy to satisfy and 
subject to forgivable reasonable police mistakes of fact at the time of arrest.  See Wayne A. 
Logan, Police Mistakes of Law, 61 EMORY L.J. 69, 109 (2011) (explaining the standard and 
decisions allowing police to make reasonable mistakes of fact); see also Herring v. United 
States, 555 U.S. 135, 139 (2009) (“When a probable-cause determination was based on 
reasonable but mistaken assumptions, the person subjected to a search or seizure has not 
necessarily been the victim of a constitutional violation.  The very phrase ‘probable cause’ 
confirms that the Fourth Amendment does not demand all possible precision.”).  
154 United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387, 423 n.6 (3d Cir. 2011) (Rendell, J., 
dissenting) (“It is the identifying information about the defendant . . . that interests the 
Government in his DNA.  Only through the use of that identifying information will 
additional crimes be solved.”).  Indeed, in Mitchell, no question existed as to the actual 
personal identity of the defendant.    
155 See, e.g., 151 CONG. REC. 28,855 (2005) (statement of Sen. Jon Kyl) (stating that “the 
efficacy of the DNA identification system in solving serious crimes depends upon casting a 
broad DNA sample collection net to produce well-populated DNA databases”).  
156 While the Mitchell court addressed the case of an indictee, and left unresolved the 
propriety of DNA sampling of arrestees, Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 412 n.22 (noting same and 
that “the finding of probable cause . . . was not left to the discretion of a polic[e] officer 
alone”), the Ninth Circuit recently condoned DNA sampling of felony arrestees, Haskell, 
669 F.3d at 1065.  Of note, none of the four named plaintiffs in the suit were convicted and 
two were not even charged.  Id. at 1078 (Fletcher, J., dissenting).  
157 See D.H. Kaye, The Constitutionality of DNA Sampling on Arrest, 10 CORNELL J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 455, 458 nn.11-12 (2001) (noting bills proposed in New York and Connecticut 
and calls by police commissioners for expanded collection).   
158 See, e.g., ARIZ. STAT. ANN. § 13-610(O)(3) (2011); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-2511(e)(1)-
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specimens is a very good bet,159 allowing for ever greater numbers of searches. 
And even if unsuccessful in securing a match, such specimens will be stored 
and allow for a potential future match, enabled by arrest or a DNA “shed.”160  
To some, such developments will doubtless be an unqualified positive.  
Those believing they have “nothing to hide” will aver that to avoid being 
subject to DNA investigation one merely needs to avoid being arrested in the 
first instance and thereafter remain free of legal suspicion.161  Moreover, 
forensic use of DNA has clear benefits, including its capacity to exonerate the 
wrongly accused and convicted and assist in the apprehension of individuals 
 
(2) (Supp. 2010); S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-3-620(A)(2) (2011).  For information on the scope 
of state laws allowing for collection of DNA samples upon arrest more generally see STATE 
[sic] THAT HAVE PASSED ARRESTEE DNA DATABASE, DNARESOURCE.COM, (2011), 
available at http://www.dnaresource.com/documents/ArresteeDNALaws-2011.pdf.   
 In addition, news reports highlight the desire of police to expand the scope of collection 
in the absence of legislative authority.  See, e.g., Jennifer Dobner, DNA Test Sought on All 
Booked at New Jail, Kennard Says It Could Cut Crime Rate in Half, DESERET NEWS (Aug. 
4, 1999), http://www.deseretnews.com/article/710914/DNA-test-sought-on-all-booked-at-
new-jail.html?pg=all (announcing sheriff’s intent to sample all arrestees and seek federal 
funding to facilitate storage and analysis).  In Orange County, California prosecutors offer 
to drop misdemeanor charges in return for a DNA sample.  See Tami Abdollah, Arrested in 
O.C.? DNA Sample Could Buy Release, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2009, at A1 (“Orange County, 
which already has one of the nation’s most aggressive programs for taking DNA samples 
from convicts, has quietly begun offering a deal to some people who have only been 
arrested: give a DNA sample and have your charges dropped.”).  Similarly, when “Occupy 
Wall Street” protesters were arrested in New York City, the bail amount required was 
altered according to each protester’s willingness to have his or her irises scanned, regardless 
of the individual’s flight risk.  Nick Pinto, As Occupy Arrestees Arraigned, Iris Scans Affect 
Bail, VILLAGE VOICE BLOGS (Mar. 19, 2012), http://blogs.villagevoice.com/runninscared/ 
2012/03/as_occupy_arres.php. Meanwhile, police in the United Kingdom have pushed for 
DNA sampling of persons stopped for speeding or littering.  See Richard Ford, Police Want 
DNA from Speeding Drivers and Litter Louts on Database, TIMES (London), Aug. 2, 2007, 
at 2.    
159 Impetus for state expansion will likely be boosted by the prospect of securing federal 
funds in return for broadened collection efforts.  See, e.g., Katie Sepich Enhanced DNA 
Collection Act of 2010, H.R. 4614, 111th Cong. (2010) (authorizing an increase in funds for 
states that implement or enhance their DNA collection processes).   
160 The latter referred to by one commentator as “covert involuntary DNA sampling.”  
Elizabeth E. Joh, Reclaiming “Abandoned” DNA: The Fourth Amendment and Genetic 
Privacy, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 857, 882 (2006).  
161 See, e.g., 150 CONG. REC. 22,956 (2004) (statement of Sen. John Cornyn) (“If the 
person whose DNA it is does not commit other crimes, then the information simply remains 
in a secure database and there is no adverse effect on his life.”).  For an extended rebuttal of 
the “nothing to hide” position, relative to privacy more generally, see generally DANIEL J. 
SOLOVE, NOTHING TO HIDE: THE FALSE TRADEOFF BETWEEN PRIVACY AND SECURITY (2011).  
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involved in unsolved crimes (allowing them to be held accountable and 
perhaps preventing other criminal activity).162  
However, expansive police arrest authority163 – and the desire to continually 
enlarge identity evidence databases164 at very little cost in time and expense165 
– should give pause for several reasons.  First, contrary to common public 
perception, DNA is not infallible.  Rather, like other evidence, it is subject to 
human error, bias, and malfeasance,166 and has figured in several wrongful 
accusations167 and convictions.168  As Professor David Kaye notes in his recent 
book: 
 
162 For an overview of these and similar arguments favoring DNA sampling of arrestees 
see Why Pass the DNA Law?, DNA SAVES, http://www.dnasaves.org/dna_law.php (last 
visited Oct. 10, 2012).   
163 By an overwhelming margin, such arrests involve misdemeanors.  See Alexandra 
Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 3) (on file 
with author) (citing studies estimating that eighty percent of state court dockets concern 
misdemeanors).  While precise data are hard to come by, large proportions of such arrests 
concern petty violations such as driving with a suspended license, marijuana possession, 
vagrancy, disorderly conduct, and loitering.  Id. (manuscript at 9-10).  
 More generally, in terms of the general population, today almost one-third of all 
Americans have been arrested for a crime by the time they reach twenty-three years of age.  
Erica Goode, Many in U.S. Are Arrested by Age 23, Study Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 
2011, at A16.  The figure in 1965 was twenty-two percent.  Id. 
164 Telling evidence of this motivational dynamic was seen in New York City, where 
police, before being enjoined, embarked upon a pilot project with portable DNA 
laboratories, swabbing the inside cheeks of persons stopped (not arrested) for traffic and 
other minor offenses.  Kevin Flynn, Fighting Crime with Ingenuity, 007 Style: Gee-Whiz 
Police Gadgets Get a Trial Run in New York, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2000, at B1; see also, 
e.g., Brendan McCarthy, As NOPD Files Away Mountain of Data from Traffic Stops, Critics 
Warn Overuse May Break Law, NOLA.COM (July 10, 2012), http://www.nola.com/crime/in 
dex.ssf/2012/07/as_nopd_files_away_mountain_of.html (discussing New Orleans police 
policy of entering into computer databases names and identifying information on individuals 
detained during pedestrian and traffic stops, based on “field interview cards”). 
165 See David Lazer & Michelle N. Mayer, DNA and the Criminal Justice System:  
Consensus and Debate, in DNA AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, supra note 103, at 359, 
370.  
166 See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., supra note 104, at 4-5, 96-97; 
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE 
UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD 132 (2009), available at http://books.nap.edu/catalog. 
php?record_id=12589.  
167 See, e.g., William Thompson, Tarnish on the “Gold Standard”: Understanding 
Recent Problems in Forensic DNA Testing, CHAMPION, Jan./Feb. 2006, at 10 (discussing 
contamination errors and sample swaps in various states); William K. Rashbaum & Joseph 
Goldstein, DNA Match Tying Protest to 2004 Killing Is Doubted, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2012, 
at A19 (noting recent laboratory error resulting in false match, based on “touch DNA” 
recovered from the scene of the Occupy Wall Street protest); Peter Jamison, SFPD Crime 
Lab’s DNA Evidence Could Be Tainted by Concealed Mistakes, S.F. WKLY. (Dec. 15, 
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How probable is it that two, correctly identified DNA genotypes would 
be the same if they originated from two unrelated individuals?  By 
definition, [such matches] do not consider any uncertainty about the 
origins of the samples (the chain-of-custody issue), about the relatedness 
of the individuals who left or contributed the samples (the identical-
alleles-by-descent issue), or about the determination of the genotypes 
themselves (the laboratory-error issue).169 
Second, use of arrest as the triggering event is problematic based on what 
we know about arrests.  Today, large percentages of the many millions of 
arrests occurring annually nationwide for felonies and misdemeanors alike do 
not result in prosecution, much less conviction.170 This statistical reality 
assumes particular importance given that the majority of jurisdictions allowing 
for DNA collection before conviction do so at the time of arrest, without first 
requiring an arraignment or a judicial finding of probable cause.171 As a result, 
unvarnished street-level determinations of probable cause by police determine 
whether a sample is added to the system.172  
 
2010), http://www.sfweekly.com/2010-12-15/news/sfpd-s-troubled-crime-lab-more-evi 
dence-of-screwups-and-coverups/ (discussing sample switches in several cases). 
168 See Greg Hampikian et al., The Genetics of Innocence: Analysis of 194 DNA 
Exonerations, 12 ANN. REV. GENOMICS & HUM. GENETICS 97, 107 (2011) (mentioning 
existence of at least fifteen exonerations in which DNA resulted in conviction).  
169 DAVID H. KAYE, THE DOUBLE HELIX AND THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 163 (2010).  
170 In California, for instance, in 2010 almost one-third of the roughly 300,000 adult 
felony arrests did not result in a conviction.  See CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN 
CALIFORNIA 49 (2010), available at http://ag.ca.gov/cjsc/publications/candd/cd10/preface 
.pdf.  National data for misdemeanor arrests suggest similar rates.  See Surrell Brady, 
Arrests Without Prosecution and the Fourth Amendment, 59 MD. L. REV. 1, 40-41 (2000).  
Other studies, however, suggest far higher non-conviction rates for misdemeanor arrests.  
See, e.g., Andrew Golub et al., Race/Ethnicity Disparity in Misdemeanor Marijuana Arrests 
in New York City, 6 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 131, 147 (2007) (reporting a non-
conviction rate for low-level offense arrests of eighty percent in New York City from 1992-
2003); Robert Sykora, Our New Permanent Punishment Machine, COUNCIL ON CRIME AND 
JUST., http://www.crimeandjustice.org/councilinfo.cfm?pID=65 (last visited Aug. 6, 2012) 
(citing statistics from Minnesota’s two largest counties indicating that in 2004 nearly sixty 
percent of misdemeanors resulted in dismissals or not guilty verdicts).  Moreover, 
conviction data themselves are of questionable weight, given that innocent individuals, 
especially those swept into high-volume justice systems struggling to process low-level 
offenses, often plead guilty merely to avoid costs associated with challenging wrongful 
arrests (e.g., remaining in jail and missing work).  See Steven Zeidman, Policing the Police: 
The Role of the Courts and the Prosecution, 32 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 315, 318 (2005).  
171 See Julie Samuels et al., Collecting DNA from Arrestees: Implementation Lessons, 
NAT’L INST. JUST. J., June 2012, at 18, 21, available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/ 
238484.pdf (explaining that two-thirds of states allowing for DNA collection upon arrest do 
not first require an arraignment or judicial determination of probable cause).    
172 Such an expansive approach, it should be noted, is also problematic from a practical 
perspective because it adds volume to a system already struggling to handle samples secured 
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Trolling and trawling for DNA become even more problematic when one 
takes into account the demographic and geographic effects of arrests.173  As 
Simon Cole has recognized:  
Criminal histories are not merely objective representations of individuals’ 
antisocial behavior or of their potential dangerousness to society. . . .  
Once inscribed into the [DNA] database, these inequities take on a 
seemingly neutral authority of their own: They appear to be pure, 
objective information, when in fact they may reflect the prejudices of 
police or judicial practitioners.174   
Such effects are especially evident in the context of police enforcement of 
minor offenses, where police discretion to arrest is at its greatest.175 
Finally, the fusing of identity verification and investigation has implications 
for other biometric identification techniques.  DNA collection, as the Mitchell 
court itself held, is unquestionably a search.176  It remains to be seen whether 
 
in a conviction-based regime.  See JEREMIAH GOULKA ET AL., RAND CORP., CTR. ON 
QUALITY POLICING, TOWARD A COMPARISON OF DNA PROFILING AND DATABASES IN THE 
UNITED STATES AND ENGLAND 17-20 (2010), available at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/ 
rand/pubs/technical_reports/2010/RAND_TR918.pdf (finding that “[d]atabase matches are 
more strongly related to the number of crime-scene samples than the number of offender 
profiles in the database” and urging that collection focus on the former); id. at 20 (“[A] 
more effective means of increasing hit rates is to increase the number of crime-scene 
profiles uploaded into the database rather than continue to add more suspects and arrestees  
. . . to the database net.”); SHELDON KRIMSKY & TANIA SIMONCELLI, GENETIC JUSTICE: DNA 
DATABANKS, CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS, AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 318-19 (2011) (noting, inter 
alia, that increased volume creates processing backlogs that can undercut investigations and 
lead to errors).       
173 See Troy Duster, Selective Arrests, an Ever-Expanding DNA Forensic Database, and 
the Specter of an Early Twenty-First Century Equivalent of Phrenology, in DNA AND THE 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, supra note 103, at 315, 319-22, 329 (surveying various ways 
such matters are reflected in DNA collection efforts); see also, e.g., JUSTICE POLICY INST., 
THE VORTEX: THE CONCENTRATED RACIAL IMPACT OF DRUG IMPRISONMENT AND THE 
CHARACTERISTICS OF PUNITIVE COUNTIES 6-9 (2007), available at http://www.justicepolicy 
.org/images/upload/07-12_REP_Vortex_AC-DP.pdf (discussing effects of police patrol 
focus on low-income and ethnic minority neighborhoods).  
174 Simon Cole, Fingerprint Identification and the Criminal Justice System: Historical 
Lessons for the DNA Debate, in DNA AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, supra note 103, 
at 63, 82. 
175 See, e.g., Golub et al., supra note 170, at 146 (stating that seventy-four to ninety-one 
percent of persons arrested in New York City from 1992 to 2003 for low-level marijuana 
offenses were African American or Latino); Aleksandar Tomic & Jahn K. Hakes, Case 
Dismissed: Police Discretion and Racial Differences in Dismissals of Felony Charges, 10 
AM. L. & ECON. REV. 110, 138-39 (2008) (discussing study results showing disproportionate 
targeting of African Americans, compared to Whites, in street-level discretionary 
enforcement of less serious offenses); Jim Dwyer, Whites Smoke Pot but Blacks Are 
Arrested, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2009, at A24.  
176 United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387, 406 (3d Cir. 2011).  
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facial and eye-related (retina and iris) identification methods, which entail no 
bodily intrusion whatsoever, will be deemed searches.177  If not, and, as Bill 
Stuntz perceptively noted years ago, privacy continues to be myopically 
defined as secrecy,178 nothing will prevent police, armed with hand-held 
devices now increasingly available, from collecting such data and conducting 
analyses when on patrol.179  Criminal history “hits” will thus provide grist to 
justify on-the-spot reasonable suspicion and probable cause determinations,180 
fueling a self-perpetuating cycle of criminal justice system contacts.181  The 
prospect becomes especially menacing if, as feared by some, DNA samples are 
 
177 Language in United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 14 (1973) to the effect that no 
reasonable expectation of privacy exists in one’s “facial characteristics” that are “constantly 
exposed to the public” will doubtless come into play.  Both the face and the eyes upon it are 
of course publicly exposed.  Emerging biometric technologies, however, change this logic, 
allowing for the computerized storage, rapid retrieval, and analysis of personal identity data, 
a process independently qualifying as a search.  Cf. Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 295 
(1973) (deeming taking of dried blood scraping a search because it enabled much closer 
laboratory examination than mere “public view” allows).  
   Also, Dionisio lacks precedential force here, for two reasons.  First, the case addressed 
whether an individual could be compelled to appear before a lawful grand jury, and did not 
involve Fourth Amendment misconduct by the police, with implications for the exclusionary 
rule.  See Dionisio, 410 U.S. at 10 (discussing ways in which the grand jury context differs 
from police patrol, inter alia, distinguishing the context from that presented by the unlawful 
arrest and fingerprinting condemned in Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969)).  Second, 
Dionisio concerned a voice exemplar and reference to facial characteristics therefore 
constituted dictum. 
178 See William J. Stuntz, Privacy’s Problem and the Law of Criminal Procedure, 93 
MICH. L. REV. 1016, 1016-17 (1995).    
179 See supra notes 1, 164 and accompanying text; see also JENNIFER LYNCH, 
IMMIGRATION POLICY CTR., FROM FINGERPRINTS TO DNA: BIOMETRIC DATA COLLECTION IN 
U.S. IMMIGRANT COMMUNITIES AND BEYOND 3-5 (2012), available at 
http://www.immigrationpolicy.org//sites/default/files/docs/Lynch%20%20Biometrics%2005
2112.pdf (describing a variety of mobile biometric scanners now in use, and their capacity 
to connect to broader databases).  Even more cutting-edge advances in technology and 
cognitive neuroscience might soon permit police to “scan” individuals’ brains to collect and 
retain identity data.  See Nita A. Farahany, Searching Secrets, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1239, 
1281-82 (2012).       
180 See, e.g., United States v. Wagers, 452 F.3d 534, 541 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding that 
knowledge of criminal history can help give rise to probable cause of current criminal 
activity); United States v. Sandoval, 29 F.3d 537, 542 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding that 
knowledge of prior criminal record can help create reasonable suspicion of current safety 
risk justifying a frisk).  
181 Cf. Cole, supra note 174, at 83 (“After passing through a DNA database, . . . the 
biased information contained in criminal records will have essentially been ‘laundered,’ and 
it will be treated as objective information imbued with the considerable authority of 
science.”). 
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put to “predictive” use regarding genetically encoded behavioral tendencies, 
like addiction, aggression, or criminal propensity.182   
Left unchecked, such developments threaten negative ramifications for 
society as a whole.  Those not yet subject to government data collection will 
seek to avoid exposure for fear of being wrongly ensnared by the system.183  
And those having had their DNA collected and stored will not only be worried 
about subjecting innocent family members to investigation as a result of 
“familial searching,”184 but also will be justly wary of venturing outside, 
especially in areas already thought worthy of criminal suspicion (e.g., a “high 
crime” or “drug blighted” area).185  Such chilling effects not only undermine 
the Fourth Amendment’s core animating purpose;186 they also implicate the 
constellation of other civil rights that depend on the liberty and privacy that it 
ensures.187   
There is no mistaking that broadened collection, storage, and use of DNA 
affords crime control benefit.  However, as with other features of the ongoing 
effort to achieve a perfected law enforcement regime, it also carries significant 
cost.  This past Term, in United States v. Jones,188 five members of the 
Supreme Court made plain their unease over this evolution, relative to 
unconstrained government use of global positioning technology to track 
 
182 See, e.g., TANIA SIMONCELLI & SHELDON KRIMSKY, AM. CONSTITUTION SOC’Y, A NEW 
ERA OF DNA COLLECTIONS: AT WHAT COST TO CIVIL LIBERTIES? 12-13 (2007), available at 
http://www.acslaw.org/sites/default/files/Simoncelli__Krimsky_-_DNA_Collection__Civil 
_Liberties.pdf.  
183 For instance, an individual is arrested and, despite having a compelling alibi and 
reason for the existence of his genetic material having been found at a crime scene, is 
nonetheless convicted based on single-minded police focus on the match and the system’s 
confidence in DNA.  See William Thompson et al., How the Probability of a False Positive 
Affects the Value of DNA Evidence, 48 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1, 2 (2003) (recounting a case with 
similar facts).  
184 See Ram, supra note 107, at 789-94 (surveying current capabilities and adverse 
effects on, inter alia, family relations).    
185 See generally Andrew G. Ferguson, Crime Mapping and the Fourth Amendment: 
Redrawing “High-Crime Areas,” 63 HASTINGS L.J. 179 (2011) (discussing caselaw 
attaching importance to geographic location in reasonable suspicion assessments by police).  
186 See generally Arnold H. Loewy, The Fourth Amendment As a Device for Protecting 
the Innocent, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1229 (1983).  For a more recent discussion, examining the 
many ways in which the lives of the factually innocent are affected by accepted police 
measures, see L. Rush Atkinson, The Bilateral Fourth Amendment and the Duties of Law-
Abiding Persons, 99 GEO. L.J. 1517, 1521-26 (2011).  
187 See, e.g., Monrad G. Paulsen, The Exclusionary Rule and Misconduct by Police, in 
POLICE POWER AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 87, 97 (Claude R. Sowle ed., 1962) (stating that 
“[a]ll the other freedoms, freedom of speech, of assembly, of religion, of political action” 
turn on the preexistence of security and privacy).  
188 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
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suspects without warrants.189  Justice Sotomayor emphasized that the low-cost, 
comprehensive, and readily storable and accessible nature of the technology, 
which can be used surreptitiously and without likely resource limit, risked 
“chill[ing] associational and expressive freedoms.”190  A similar sensitivity is 
now warranted in the collection, storage, and use of DNA, which if left 
unconstrained, will have an array of kindred troubling consequences.  
2. The Exclusionary Rule and Identity Evidence  
Judicial difficulty with identity evidence has not been limited to instances in 
which police act lawfully and secure the evidence.  Indeed, for some time 
courts have wrestled with whether police misconduct, resulting in the 
acquisition of identity evidence, and affording an independent basis for 
prosecution, should trigger application of the exclusionary rule.  
In significant part the confusion can be traced to the Supreme Court’s 1984 
decision in INS v. Lopez-Mendoza,191 involving the illegal arrest of two 
Mexican nationals.  One defendant, Lopez-Mendoza, objected to being 
summoned to a deportation hearing based on information provided to agents as 
a result of his illegal arrest.  The other, Sandoval-Sanchez, rather than 
challenging the court’s jurisdiction over him at his deportation hearing, sought 
to have identity-related evidence linking him to his immigration record 
suppressed.  The Court, by a five-four vote, rejected both claims.  
At the outset of its opinion, seemingly directing itself to Lopez-Mendoza’s 
jurisdictional claim, the majority wrote that “[t]he ‘body’ or identity of a 
defendant or a respondent in a criminal or civil proceeding is never itself 
suppressible as a fruit of an unlawful arrest, even if it is conceded that an 
unlawful arrest, search, or interrogation occurred.”192  Turning to Sandoval-
Sanchez’s “more substantial claim,” challenging not his physical presence but 
rather identity evidence offered at the hearing, the majority cast the issue in 
terms of whether the exclusionary rule applied to deportation proceedings.  
Even though such proceedings have long been regarded as civil in nature 
and hence exempt from application of the exclusionary rule, the majority 
nonetheless analyzed whether the rule should apply, weighing the benefits of 
exclusion – especially deterrence of police misconduct – against the costs of 
 
189 Id. at 954 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 957 (Alito, J., concurring).   
190 Id. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); see also id. at 955-56 (“GPS monitoring 
generates a precise, comprehensive record of a person’s public movements that reflects a 
wealth of detail about her familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations . 
. . .  The Government can store such records and efficiently mine them for information years 
into the future.”); id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring) (“[S]ociety’s expectation has been that 
law enforcement agents and others would not – and indeed, in the main, simply could not – 
secretly monitor and catalogue every single movement of an individuals’ car for a very long 
period.”).   
191 468 U.S. 1032 (1984).  
192 Id. at 1039.  
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excluding valuable probative evidence.  According to the majority, any 
possible deterrent effect was reduced by several factors, including that proof of 
alienage could “sometimes be [proven] using evidence gathered independently 
of, or sufficiently attenuated from, the original arrest,”193 that internal 
immigration agency rules contained a comprehensive scheme for deterring 
Fourth Amendment violations by agents,194 and that declaratory relief was 
available for any agency-wide abuse.195  
The social costs of exclusion, on the other hand, were “both unusual and 
significant.”196  Not only are exclusionary rule proceedings inconsistent with 
the “deliberately . . . streamlined” immigration system,197 but immigration 
violations themselves present special concern.198  “Applying the exclusionary 
rule in proceedings that are intended not to punish past transgressions but to 
prevent their continuance or renewal would require the courts to close their 
eyes to ongoing violations of the law.”199  Suppression of evidence resulting in 
Sandoval-Sanchez’s release  
would clearly frustrate the express public policy against an alien’s 
unregistered presence in this country. . . .  The constable’s blunder may 
allow the criminal to go free, but we have never suggested that it allows 
the criminal to continue in the commission of an ongoing crime.  When 
the crime in question involves unlawful presence in this country, the 
criminal may go free, but he should not go free within our borders.200  
Before ending, the majority cautioned that its assessment might change if 
evidence existed of “widespread” Fourth Amendment violations by 
immigration agents or an instance of an “egregious violation” of the Fourth 
Amendment, not evident in the present case.201  
While courts today most often read Lopez-Mendoza’s bar on suppression of 
identity evidence narrowly, consistent with its apparent limited application to 
jurisdiction over a defendant,202 confusion lingers over whether identity 
evidence is categorically exempt from possible suppression.  
 
193 Id. at 1043.  
194 Id. at 1044-45.  
195 Id. at 1045. 
196 Id. at 1046.  
197 Id. at 1048-49.  
198 Id. at 1046-47.  
199 Id. at 1047.  
200 Id.  
201 Id. at 1050-51.  
202 See, e.g., United States v. Olivares-Rangel, 458 F.3d 1104, 1111 (10th Cir. 2006) 
(“[T]he Supreme Court’s statement [in Lopez-Mendoza] that the ‘body’ or identity of a 
defendant are ‘never suppressible’ applies only to cases in which the defendant challenges 
the jurisdiction of the court over him or her based upon the unconstitutional arrest, not to 
cases in which the defendant only challenges the admissibility of the identity-related 
evidence.”); United States v. Guevara-Martinez, 262 F.3d 751, 753 (8th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he 
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One judicial camp holds that application of the exclusionary rule turns on 
the motivation of officers in securing the evidence: whether police are seeking 
to verify identity or investigate criminal activity.  If identity evidence is 
secured for an “administrative” purpose, “simply ascertaining or confirming 
the identity of the person arrested and routinely determining the criminal 
history and outstanding warrants of the person arrested,” it is admissible.203  If, 
however, an illegal seizure is motivated in whole or part by an investigative 
purpose to secure information for use in an unrelated case, the information is 
subject to suppression.  
Such a result, the courts reason, is consistent with the Supreme Court’s 
decisions in Hayes v. Florida and Davis v. Mississippi, where the Court barred 
admission of fingerprint evidence secured as a result of illegal arrests executed 
to obtain prints to aid ongoing criminal investigations.204  These courts also 
suppress derivative or secondary evidence obtained from government 
databases by the use of such identification (like the immigration records in 
Lopez-Mendoza).205 
A majority of other courts, however, exempt identity evidence from possible 
exclusion.  The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in United States v. Farias-
Gonzalez206 exemplifies one approach to this outcome.  There, agents allegedly 
unlawfully seized the defendant and secured his fingerprints and a photo, 
resulting in his criminal prosecution for illegal reentry after deportation.  While 
ostensibly eschewing Lopez-Mendoza’s categorical bar, the Farias-Gonzalez 
court achieved the same result, invoking the deterrence-based rationale of the 
exclusionary rule and deeming “identity-related evidence . . . never 
suppressible.”207  
Applying the rationale of the Supreme Court’s decision in Hudson v. 
Michigan,208 the Eleventh Circuit first concluded that any deterrent benefit of 
excluding identity evidence was outweighed by its social costs.209  Next, citing 
the Supreme Court’s decisions in Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of 
Nevada, holding that police can demand the name of a suspect lawfully 
 
Court’s reference to the suppression of identity [in Lopez-Mendoza] appears to be tied only 
to a jurisdictional issue, not to an evidentiary issue.”).  
203 Olivares-Rangel, 458 F.3d at 1112-13.  
204 Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 815 (1985); Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727 
(1969).  
205 See, e.g., Olivares-Rangel, 458 F.3d at 1119 (concluding that illegally obtained 
fingerprints and immigration records, leading to criminal prosecution, were “inextricably 
linked” and suppression of former dictated suppression of latter). 
206 556 F.3d 1181 (11th Cir. 2009).  
207 Id. at 1189.    
208 547 U.S. 586, 591 (2006) (holding that the exclusionary rule is “applicable only 
‘where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served’ – that is, where its 
deterrence benefits outweigh its substantial social costs” (quoting United States v. Calandra, 
414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974))).  
209 Farias-Gonzalez, 556 F.3d at 1189. 
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stopped for suspected criminal activity,210 and United States v. Dionisio, 
holding that individuals have no right to withhold a voice exemplar in a lawful 
grand jury proceeding,211 the Eleventh Circuit held that police could “freely 
obtain[]” and use the identity evidence (fingerprints and photo) of the illegally 
seized Farias-Gonzalez.212  
Furthermore, the court reasoned, even if all identity evidence were 
suppressed, the government could simply collect new, admissible identity 
evidence and initiate a new prosecution.  This was “because identity-related 
evidence is not unique evidence that, once suppressed, cannot be obtained by 
other means.  The application of the exclusionary rule to identity-related 
evidence will have a minimal deterrence benefit, as its true effect will often be 
merely to postpone a criminal prosecution.”213  
The court discounted the likelihood of “rampant violations” of the Fourth 
Amendment ensuing as a result of its decision to immunize identity evidence 
from possible suppression.  This was because, as the Supreme Court held in 
Hudson, civil suits afford sufficient deterrence of such practices.214  Moreover, 
because identity evidence was not subject to suppression police would lack 
motivation to engage in Fourth Amendment violations.215  
Finally, having concluded that defendant’s photograph and fingerprints were 
not suppressible, the court addressed whether his immigration file (A-File), 
which formed the basis for his reentry prosecution, was subject to possible 
suppression.  Again, the Eleventh Circuit rebuffed the claim.  Because the 
defendant’s identity was known by police as a result of the non-suppressible 
identity evidence secured, and the A-File itself in the government’s possession 
was independently lawfully created and retained, the latter was not subject to 
suppression.216   
In People v. Tolentino,217 the New York Court of Appeals relied upon both 
Farias-Gonzalez and Lopez-Mendoza to deem identity evidence non-
suppressible, this time in a non-immigration context.218  In Tolentino, police 
stopped defendant, allegedly without a lawful basis, for violating a noise 
ordinance while driving, learned his name, and conducted a computer check of 
Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) files to obtain his driving record.  When 
 
210 Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 177, 185-86 (2004). 
211 United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 15 (1973).  
212 Farias-Gonzalez, 556 F.3d at 1188. 
213 Id. at 1189.  
214 Id.  
215 See id. at 1188 (observing that police had “no incentive to violate the Fourth 
Amendment, as the evidence was freely obtainable without implicating the Fourth 
Amendment”).  
216 Id. at 1189.   
217 926 N.E.2d 1212 (N.Y.), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 595 (2010), and cert. dismissed, 
131 S. Ct. 1387 (2011).  
218 Id. at 1215. 
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the check revealed that Tolentino’s license was suspended and had been 
suspended in the past, he was arrested and charged with aggravated unlicensed 
operation of a motor vehicle. 219  The Tolentino court first invoked Lopez-
Mendoza’s blanket bar on suppression and proclaimed, as several other courts 
have,220 that name and identity can never be subject to suppression.221  The 
court then addressed what it saw as the sole remaining issue: whether 
defendant could successfully seek suppression of his DMV files, which were 
accessed as a result of the allegedly unlawful stop and triggered his arrest.222  
Again invoking Farias-Gonzalez, the Tolentino court held that the DMV 
records were not suppressible.223  Even though they were accessed only as a 
result of identity information secured by the allegedly illegal stop, the records 
themselves “were obtained by the police from a source independent of the 
claimed illegal stop.”224 
The court then reiterated the Eleventh Circuit’s various policy-based 
arguments against use of the exclusionary rule,225 and downplayed worry that 
police would be given an incentive to illegally detain persons in order to secure 
identity evidence and a link to government records.226  According to the court, 
“[p]olice are already deterred from conducting illegal car stops because 
evidence recovered in the course of an illegal stop remains subject to the 
exclusionary rule.”227   
The court closed by distinguishing Davis and Hayes, where the Supreme 
Court barred admission of identity evidence – fingerprints.228  Police in those 
cases, the court reasoned, illegally seized individuals to obtain fingerprints to 
link them to crimes actively being investigated, based on latent prints left at 
crime scenes.229  With defendant Tolentino, only a name was secured, and the 
exclusionary rule was inapplicable when “the only link between improper 
 
219 Id. at 1213-14. 
220 See, e.g., United States v. Bowley, 435 F.3d 426, 430-31 (3d Cir. 2006) (“[W]e doubt 
that the Court lightly used such a sweeping word as ‘never’ in deciding when identity may 
be suppressed as the fruit of an illegal search or arrest.”); United States v. Del Toro Gudino, 
376 F.3d 997, 1001 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that identity may not be suppressed even in 
cases of egregious constitutional violations, noting that when the Court said “‘never’ 
suppressible, it meant ‘never’”). 
221 Tolentino, 926 N.E.2d at 1214.  The court quoted Farias-Gonzalez for the proposition 
that “[a] contrary holding would ‘permit[] a defendant to hide who he is [and] would 
undermine the administration of the criminal justice system.’”  Id. (quoting Farias-
Gonzalez, 556 F.3d at 1187). 
222 Id. 
223 Id. at 1214-16. 
224 Id. at 1216.  
225 Id.  
226 Id.  
227 Id.  
228 See supra note 204 and accompanying text.  
229 Tolentino, 926 N.E.2d at 1216.  
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police activity and the disputed evidence is that the police learned the 
defendant’s name.”230   
As the foregoing makes clear, courts are in considerable disarray on whether 
identity evidence can be suppressed.  A minority of courts are amenable to 
suppression and look to the particular facts of each seizure to determine if it 
was motivated by a desire to secure identity evidence to tie a defendant to an 
unsolved crime.  If instead police were motivated to simply verify a detainee’s 
identity, then the identity evidence – and its role in linking defendant to other 
criminal activity – is not subject to suppression.  These courts voice concern 
that a per se bar of the exclusionary rule will, as the Tenth Circuit put it, “give 
the police carte blanche powers to engage in any manner of unconstitutional 
conduct” and use identity evidence to achieve broader enforcement goals.231  
An increasing majority of courts, however, deem identity evidence immune 
to possible exclusion.  To these courts, identity evidence is unique in nature, 
warranting a special carve-out from the exclusionary rule,232 which otherwise 
usually results in the suppression of secondary or derivative evidence accessed 
as a result of police misconduct, such as government records.  
The disarray is regrettable for several reasons.  First, accepting as one 
should that Lopez-Mendoza does not rule out use of the exclusionary rule with 
identity evidence in criminal cases, the caselaw manifests a remarkable naiveté 
about the role of identity evidence in modern law enforcement.  As both the 
majority and dissent in Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court acknowledged, 
identity information – even a name – can afford immediate access to an ever-
growing universe of government information providing major investigative 
benefit.233  
Police, mindful of this benefit, have significant incentive to neutralize 
individual anonymity.  To offer but two examples among many beyond the 
 
230 Id.  
231 United States v. Olivares-Rangel, 458 F.3d 1104, 1111 (10th Cir. 2006); see also 
United States v. Juan-Torres, 441 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1122 (D.N.M. 2006) (“If police are free 
to detain and question anyone they want in order to obtain the person’s identity, without fear 
of the exclusionary rule, they may be tempted, even in the absence of reasonable suspicion, 
to single out people of certain ethnic backgrounds for questioning.”); Tolentino, 926 N.E.2d 
at 1218 (Ciparick, J., dissenting) (asserting that the majority provided “law enforcement an 
incentive to illegally stop, detain, and search anyone for the sole purpose of discovering the 
person’s identity and determining if it matches any government records accessible by the 
police”).   
232 See, e.g., United States v. Del Toro Gudino, 376 F.3d 997, 1001 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(deeming identity evidence “inherently different from other kinds of evidence”). 
233 See Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 177, 191 (2004) (explaining that 
“furnishing identity” can “give[] police a link in the chain of evidence needed to convict the 
individual of a separate offense”); id. at 196 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[A] name can provide 
the key to a broad array of information about the person, particularly in the hands of a police 
officer with access to a range of law enforcement databases.  And that information, in turn, 
can be tremendously useful in a criminal prosecution.”).  
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immigration context, knowledge of identity secured as a result of an illegal 
arrest can lead to prosecution pursuant to sex offender registration laws234 or 
protective orders.235  In addition, short of serving as an independent basis for 
prosecution, knowledge of identity allows police rapid access to criminal 
history or “status” databases (for example, those listing alleged gang 
affiliations).236  
Acquisition and storage of identity information can also serve to justify 
future searches and seizures.  In New York City, for instance, police for a time  
retained in an electronic database identity information on all persons stopped 
and frisked and used it to bolster criminal suspicion in subsequent 
encounters.237  After the state legislature banned the computer storage of 
identity information on persons stopped but not arrested, police continued to 
retain and use such information in paper form.238  
“[T]he simple fact of who a defendant is,”239 in short, is actually not so 
simple when it comes to law enforcement.  In an era when police enjoy 
unprecedented lawful discretionary authority to seize individuals without 
warrants, including on a pretextual basis,240 categorical judicial refusal to apply 
the exclusionary rule allows police to engage in fishing expeditions or targeted 
seizures to secure identity evidence.241  Officers otherwise prohibited from 
seizing an individual solely to “ascertain . . . identity,”242 can achieve the 
 
234 For instance, learned identity could indicate to police that a convicted sex offender is 
residing in a residence other than that provided to authorities.  See, e.g., 42 PA. CONS. STAT. 
ANN. § 9795.2 (West 2007) (specifying reporting requirement and allowing for felony 
conviction if that requirement is violated).  Alternatively, the individual could run afoul of 
laws prohibiting registrants from visiting certain public areas.  See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN.  
§ 856.022 (West Supp. 2012) (establishing offense of “loitering or prowling by certain 
offenders in close proximity to children”); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5 / 11-9.4 (West 
Supp. 2011) (making it a felony to approach, contact, reside, or communicate with a “child 
within certain places”).   
235 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 209A, §§ 3, 7 (2010).    
236 See generally K. Babe Howell, Gang Databases: Labeled for Life, CHAMPION, 
July/Aug. 2011, at 28. 
237 Ray Rivera & Al Baker, Police Cite Help from Stop-and-Frisk Data in 170 Cases, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2010, at A15.   
238 Rocco Parascandola, Write On, Say Cops: Brass Says Stop & Frisk Records Aren’t 
Dead, Just Use Paper, Not Computers, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, July 22, 2010, at 2.  
239 United States v. Del Toro Gudino, 376 F.3d 997, 1001 (9th Cir. 2004).  
240 See supra notes 148-151 and accompanying text.  
241 See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 596 (2006) (“[T]he value of deterrence 
depends upon the strength of the incentive to commit the forbidden act.”); Elkins v. United 
States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960) (“The [exclusionary] rule is calculated to prevent, not 
repair.  Its purpose is to deter – to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only 
effective available way – by removing the incentive to disregard it.”).  
242 Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 (1979) (banning the practice and expressing concern 
over the risk of “arbitrary and abusive police practices”).   
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identical result when they illegally seize the same individual and use 
discovered identity to scan government databases in the interest of pursuing an 
entirely unrelated prosecution.  Importantly, moreover, police motivation 
operates largely free of any countervailing deterrent effect resulting from 
personal monetary liability for alleged civil rights violations pursuant to §1983 
or Bivens.243 
Yet even the approach adopted by the minority of courts evincing a more 
skeptical view – allowing exclusion only if an illegal police seizure is 
motivated by investigative (not administrative) purposes – is  problematic.  
This is so for several reasons.  First, it is not uncommon for such courts to 
narrow the band of possible exclusion even further: to be concerned about only 
fingerprint evidence,244 deeming other forms of identity evidence to be exempt 
from exclusion.245  To these courts, this is all that the Supreme Court’s Davis 
and Hayes decisions, which concerned fingerprints, can be presumed to 
warrant.  Singling out fingerprint evidence alone, however, is decidedly under-
inclusive.  While fingerprints perhaps to date qualified as the “paradigmatic 
identity evidence,”246 names and certainly biometric identifiers can afford as 
much if not more utility to police as links to government databases.247  
Second, tying exclusion to police purpose creates an array of difficulties of 
its own.  The Court has repeatedly refused to attach Fourth Amendment 
significance to the subjective intent of individual officers acting without 
warrants.248  The pragmatic reason for doing so is highlighted by caselaw 
 
243 See David J.R. Frakt, Fruitless Poisonous Trees in a Parallel Universe: Hudson v. 
Michigan, Knock-and-Announce, and the Exclusionary Rule, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 659, 
691-96 (2007) (discussing limited bases for recovery for wrongful police searches and 
seizures and disincentives for suits more generally, absent egregious police misconduct).    
244 See, e.g., United States v. Oscar-Torres, 597 F.3d 224, 229-30 (4th Cir. 2007); United 
States v. Perez-Perez, 337 F.3d 990, 994 (8th Cir. 2003). 
245 In United States v. Arias, 678 F.2d 1202 (4th Cir. 1982), for instance, defendants filed 
a motion to suppress asserting that “the identity of the van’s occupants would never have 
been discovered had the van not been stopped.”  Id. at 1206.  The Fourth Circuit, noting that 
“this may be true,” held that the name of a defendant “is not suppressible under the 
exclusionary rule.”  Id.; see also, e.g., United States v. Navarro-Diaz, 420 F.3d 581, 588 
(6th Cir. 2005) (refusing to exclude name and date of birth information secured as a result of 
illegal arrest); United States v. Del Toro Gudino, 376 F.3d 997, 1001 (9th Cir. 2004) (“We 
continue to hold today that the simple fact of who a defendant is cannot be excluded, 
regardless of the nature of the violation leading to his identity.”).   
246 People v. Tolentino, 926 N.E.2d 1212, 1218 (N.Y. 2011) (Ciparick, J., dissenting).  
247 Names and other identity evidence, no less than fingerprints, are “something of 
evidentiary value which the public authorities have caused an arrested person to yield to 
them during illegal detention.”  Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 724 (1969) (quoting 
Bynum v. United States, 262 F.2d 465, 467 (D.C. Cir. 1958)).  Here, the evidentiary value 
lies in linking the detainee to a government database. 
248 See, e.g., Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 260 (2007); Brigham City v. Stuart, 
547 U.S. 398, 404 (2006); Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813-14 (1996).   
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concerning automobile checkpoints, one of the acknowledged exceptions to the 
search warrant requirement.249  Courts have struggled to discern whether the 
purpose of a given checkpoint is something other than crime control or 
detection, which constitutionally redeems police behavior.250  The challenge, 
difficult enough in the context of programs and policies,251 becomes radically 
more so in the context of individual officer initiative.  
Allowing for suppression of identity evidence if an illegal seizure is “in 
part” motivated by an investigative purpose is no more tenable.252  While 
perhaps less difficult to apply than a “primary purpose” test,253 the standard 
presents obvious proof concerns, if for no other reason than that officers, faced 
with possible exclusion of identity evidence, will feel pressure to cast their 
purpose as purely administrative in nature.254  For instance, an officer with a 
mere hunch of unlawful activity taking place could execute an illegal stop, 
secure identity evidence (name, prints, or biometric data), run it in a 
government database, and develop an entirely unrelated criminal case, perhaps 
of a more serious (and career-enhancing) nature.  All the officer need do to 
ensure admissibility of the evidence is articulate an administrative need – such 
as ascertaining or confirming “who the detainee is.”255   
 
249 See 1 JOSHUA DRESSLER & ALAN MICHAELS, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
§§ 15.01, 18.04-.05 (5th ed. 2010) (discussing, inter alia, administrative searches, vehicle 
checkpoints, and automobile inventories).    
250 See generally Brooks Holland, The Road ‘Round Edmond: Steering Through Primary 
Purposes and Crime Control Agendas, 111 PENN ST. L. REV. 293, 299-327 (2006) 
(surveying difficulties encountered by courts in assessing programmatic purpose).  
251 Id.; cf. Ram, supra note 107, at 783-86 (criticizing current state efforts to allow 
“fortuitous” yet not “deliberate” partial familial DNA matches, asserting that doing so, inter 
alia, encourages strategic behavior among laboratory personnel and defeats governmental 
transparency).      
252 See United States v. Olivares-Rangel, 458 F.3d 1104, 1116 (10th Cir. 2006).  
253 With checkpoints, it remains unclear whether a secondary crime control purpose will 
defeat a non-crime control primary one, a possibility signaled by the Court in City of 
Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 47 n.2 (2000).  See Holland, supra note 250, at 301-
02.     
254 Cf. United States v. Gross, 662 F.3d 393, 405 (6th Cir. 2011) (holding that the 
exclusionary rule must potentially apply when an illegal stop reveals an outstanding arrest 
warrant because doing otherwise “would create perverse incentives. We do not wish to 
create a system of post-hoc rationalization through which the Fourth Amendment’s 
prohibition against illegal searches and seizures can be nullified.”).  On testimonial 
pressures felt by police more generally in the suppression context see, for example, Morgan 
Cloud, Judges, “Testilying,” and the Constitution, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1341 (1996); 
Christopher Slobogin, Testilying: Police Perjury and What to Do About It, 67 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 1037 (1996). 
255 Olivares-Rangel, 458 F.3d at 1112-13 (condoning police taking of prints “for the 
purpose of simply ascertaining or confirming the identity of the person arrested and 
routinely determining the criminal history and outstanding warrants of the person arrested”).  
Whether an officer’s administrative motive can trump legislative intent evincing an express 
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IV. RECONCEIVING IDENTITY EVIDENCE  
It is difficult to say how the complexities noted above can be best addressed.  
However, any corrective path must first resolve a basic uncertainty: the 
definitional contours of identity evidence itself.  
The confusion was in ample evidence at the Tolentino Supreme Court oral 
argument in March 2011.  In a remarkably disjointed and meandering session, 
the Justices confidently suggested that visual observations by police are subject 
to suppression,256 even though disagreement remains on the question.257  
Members of the Court also expressed obvious frustration over the ongoing 
judicial failure to view identity evidence (including one’s name) as anything 
more than abstract information, independent of its attendant utility vis-à-vis 
government databases.258  
Even more telling of the uncertainty was an exchange between Justice 
Kagan and counsel for the U.S. Department of Justice, as amicus curiae, 
 
investigative purpose, as in Louisiana’s law directing police to collect DNA samples from 
arrestees, presents an intriguing question.  See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:602 (West 2005) 
(“The Louisiana Legislature finds and declares that DNA data banks are important tools in 
criminal investigations . . . .”).       
256 See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 20, Tolentino v. New York, 131 S. Ct. 595 
(2010) (No. 09-11556) (“[N]obody’s contending that [the policeman’s visual identification 
of the individual driving the car] can’t be suppressed. . . .  What should have been 
suppressed was the policeman’s identification of the person who was driving the car.”) 
(statement of Scalia, J.).  
257 See, e.g., Sossamon v. State, 816 S.W.2d 340, 348 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).  Courts 
denying the claim invariably cite to United States v. Crews, where a majority of justices 
rejected the view that a defendant’s face can be a suppressible fruit of an illegal arrest.  See 
United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 477 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring in part); id. at 477-
78 (White, J., concurring in the result).  However, Crews concerned only the due process 
implications of an in-court identification, not Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule analysis.  
See id. at 473 n.19 (majority opinion) (noting that “a satisfactory resolution of the [due 
process] reliability issue does not provide a complete answer to the consideration underlying 
[the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule]”).  Furthermore, the five justices concurring in 
the outcome, yet wishing the Court’s opinion to be clearer on whether one’s face can be 
suppressible fruit, were animated by concern that physical jurisdiction over the defendant 
not be defeated (as in Lopez-Mendoza).  See id. at 477 (Powell, J., concurring in part) (citing 
Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952)); id. at 477-78 (White, J., concurring in the result).  
Similarly, for reasons earlier discussed, the Court’s statement in United States v. Dionisio, 
410 U.S. 1, 14 (1973) – that “a man’s facial characteristics” are “constantly exposed to the 
public” and are therefore not protected by the Fourth Amendment – lacks precedential force. 
See supra note 177. 
258 See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 33, Tolentino, 131 S. Ct. 595 (No. 09-
11556) (“[Y]ou keep saying . . . you’re just talking about the names, but names are 
meaningless in the abstract.  It’s not just that the officer wants to know what to call him.  
It’s what he wants to find out from the name.”) (statement of Roberts, C.J.); id. at 34 
(“[O]nce you get the guy’s name you’re interested in a lot of things.”) (statement of Kagan, 
J.).  
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regarding whether police could, in Justice Kagan’s words, secure a DNA 
sample and use that sample to show that “this is a guy who . . . did these 
various terrible things, and start building [a] case[].”259  Counsel demurred but 
offered that some question might exist over whether biometric information 
such as DNA – unlike names and fingerprints, “traditionally used to identify a 
defendant” and not, according to counsel, subject to Fourth Amendment 
limit260 – could be secured by police.  In addition to raising increased medical 
and personal privacy concerns, counsel reasoned that DNA acquisition entails 
“pricking someone with a needle.”261  
While perhaps tactically sound, counsel’s response underscores the critical 
need for a more realistic understanding of identity evidence.  Just as courts 
have been prone to regard only fingerprints as warranting exclusionary rule 
attention,262 DNA is coming to be seen as the end-all of identity evidence.  
While DNA can implicate privacy issues that differ from other forms of 
identity evidence,263 it also serves as a personal identifier – much like facial 
recognition, iris/retina recognition, names, and fingerprints – and plays an 
increasingly important role in modern-day police work.  Moreover, contrary to 
the view of counsel, DNA of course can be secured without piercing the skin 
surface.264 
Going forward, courts should focus less on the form and more on the 
function of identity evidence and heed its actual – not presumed – history.  Just 
as courts have resorted to enfeebled historical analogies in their assessment of 
what constitutes a modern-day search for Fourth Amendment purposes,265 they 
have taken undue liberty with the history of identification techniques.  As 
previously discussed, early techniques, such as fingerprinting and “mugging,” 
enjoyed comparatively limited use.  Generally, only in instances of conviction, 
usually for more serious offenses, was information allowed to be collected, 
stored, and later used – and only to verify personal identity.266  
So understood, the warrantless collection, retention, and use of DNA 
samples of arrestees can be more properly addressed.  While the Supreme 
Court has never directly addressed the constitutional propriety of collecting 
 
259 Id. at 51.  
260 See id. at 51-52.   
261 Id. 
262 See supra note 244 and accompanying text.  
263 On whether “junk DNA” used to compile profiles unavoidably contains private 
medical information and the propriety of the current government practice of retaining such 
biological samples, see generally Simon A. Cole, Is the “Junk” DNA Designation Bunk?, 
102 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 54 (2007), 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/Colloquy/2007/23/LRColl2007n23Cole.pdf. 
264  See supra note 104 and accompanying text. 
265 See Luke M. Milligan, Analogy Breakers: A Reality Check on Emerging 
Technologies, 80 MISS. L.J. 1319, 1322-23 (2011).  
266 See supra notes 108-122 and accompanying text.  
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identity evidence from lawfully arrested individuals, policy and modern 
caselaw support allowing the use of such evidence for identity verification.  
For instance, the justice system has a legitimate need to secure identity 
information on who has been taken into lawful custody, as the Supreme Court 
in Hiibel made clear.267  Likewise, police, incident to a lawful arrest, can 
search the area within an arrestee’s immediate physical control and secure 
identity information.268  
Importantly, however, collection differs from retention of identity evidence.  
As explained earlier, jurisdictions are eager to not only collect DNA samples 
(under federal law, by force if necessary269) but also retain them, which, if left 
unrestricted, will enable fishing expeditions.270  To limit this threat, identity 
evidence should be retained only on individuals lawfully convicted of crimes.  
Doing so aligns modern with historical practice271 and is consistent with Fourth 
Amendment doctrine ascribing a lessened expectation of privacy among 
persons lawfully convicted of crimes.272  Any DNA sample taken by non-
consensual means and stored, in the absence of conviction, should be 
destroyed.273  In keeping with the policy of seven states274 (but not the federal 
 
267 See Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 177, 188-89 (2003).  Prior to Hiibel, 
the right of police to demand identity information was less than certain.  See, e.g., Berkemer 
v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984) (stating in dictum that a suspect detained during a 
lawful Terry stop “is not obliged to respond” to questions); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 34 
(1968) (White, J., concurring) (stating that a lawfully detained suspect can be questioned but 
“is not obliged to answer, answers may not be compelled, and refusal to answer furnishes no 
basis for arrest”). 
268 See Wayne A. Logan, An Exception Swallows a Rule: Police Authority to Search 
Incident to Arrest, 19 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 381, 391-97 (2001) (discussing caselaw 
affording police authority to search individuals incident to arrest).   
269 See 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(a)(4)(A) (2006) (“The Attorney General . . . may use or 
authorize the use of such means as are reasonably necessary to . . . collect a DNA sample 
from an individual who refuses to cooperate in the collection of the sample.”).  See also U.S. 
MARSHALLS SERV., PRISONER OPERATIONS 2 (2009), available at http://www.usmarshals.gov 
/foia/Directives-Policy/prisoner_ops/dna.pdf (explaining that personnel “are authorized . . . 
to use such means are reasonably necessary to . . . collect a DNA sample from an individual 
who is unwilling to submit to DNA collection”).  Failure to cooperate by an individual is 
classified as a class A misdemeanor.  See 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(a)(5)(A).      
270 See supra note 231 and accompanying text.  
271 See supra notes 108-122 and accompanying text.  
272 See, e.g., Sampson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 848-49 (2006) (finding lessened 
expectation of privacy on part of parolee); United States v.  Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 117-18 
(2001) (finding same with respect to probationer); United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 
837 n.32 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (“Those who have suffered a lawful conviction lose an 
interest in their identity to a degree well-recognized as sufficient to entitle the government 
permanently to maintain a verifiable record of their identity.”).  
273 DNA acquired by means of “shedding,” akin to abandonment, while not free of 
controversy, would not be subject to the requirement.  
274 See STATE [sic] THAT HAVE PASSED ARRESTEE DNA DATABASE LAWS, supra note 
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government275), this should occur automatically, without requiring legally 
innocent individuals to undertake a cumbersome, expensive, and uncertain 
expungement process.276  Ultimately, these changes will hopefully help restore 
a suppressed sensitivity to the importance of identity information itself.  As 
Judge Alex Kozinski recently observed: 
[W]e have become accustomed to having our fingerprints on file in some 
government database.  The suggestion that law enforcement agencies . . . 
must destroy the fingerprints of those who were wrongly arrested and 
booked, and were later released, would today be greeted by reactions 
ranging from apathy to disdainful snigger.  Why?  Because we have come 
to accept that people – even totally innocent people – have no legitimate 
expectation of privacy in their fingerprints, and that’s that.277 
And just as collection and retention of identity evidence require varied 
analysis, so too does its use.  While courts, such as the Third Circuit in 
Mitchell, have been prone to carelessly merge the verification and investigative 
functions of identity evidence,278 government should be barred from using 
identity evidence secured from a lawful arrestee for any purpose other than 
identity verification.  When government uses identity evidence forensically – 
to investigative an arrestee’s possible role in other criminal activity – a distinct 
government purpose (and hence search) is pursued.279  Focusing on the actual 
 
158.  In this regard, it is worthwhile to note that the European Court of Human Rights 
recently condemned the U.K.’s practice of retaining arrestees’ biometric identity 
information.  See S. & Marper v. United Kingdom, 48 Eur. H.R. Rep. 50, 1195-1202 (2009) 
(holding that retaining such information violates Article 8 of the Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms).  For discussion of other nations’ 
positions on the collection and retention of DNA, including Canada, which imposes the 
most controls, see generally Liz Campbell, “Non-Conviction” DNA Databases and 
Criminal Justice: A Comparative Analysis, 2011 J. COMMONWEALTH CRIM. L. 55. 
275 See 42 U.S.C. § 14132(d) (2006) (requiring that DNA records be expunged but only if 
the proper government official receives verification that a conviction was overturned, 
charges were dismissed, or the arrestee was acquitted).  This was done because Congress 
wished to relieve the government of the “unwieldy requirement” of having to “track the 
progress of individual criminal cases.” 151 CONG. REC. 28,855 (2005) (statement of Sen. 
Jon Kyl).  
276 A similar policy should be adopted with respect to fingerprint evidence, as to which 
arrestees currently do not even have a lawful right to seek expungement.  See 151 CONG. 
REC. 28,857 (2005) (statement of Sen. Jon Kyl) (explaining that under the DNA Fingerprint 
Act of 2005 there “is no expungement of fingerprints from the national database, even if the 
arrestee is acquitted or charges are dismissed”). 
277 Kincade, 379 F.3d at 874 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). 
278 See supra notes 134-135 and accompanying text.  
279 See, e.g., Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 618 (1989) (stating that 
“the collection and subsequent analysis of . . . biological samples must be deemed Fourth 
Amendment searches”).  As the Arizona Supreme Court recently observed, extracting cell 
samples from a suspect and processing them to create a DNA sample for investigative use 
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use of the identity information secured will reduce the risk of identity evidence 
dragnets by police who, already enjoying expansive discretionary arrest 
authority, will otherwise be tempted to make investigative use of identity 
databases.280  If distinct focus on governmental use of data collected by 
generalized public surveillance methods is warranted,281 it is most assuredly 
also warranted relative to identity information secured as a result of seizures of 
individuals.   
A similar sensitivity to the crucial role of identity evidence must also come 
to characterize the judicial response to instances when such evidence results 
from unlawful stops and arrests by police.  Here, however, there comes what 
has been called a “practical problem”282 of considerable difficulty: having 
discovered a detainee’s criminal conduct, can it reasonably be expected that 
the government will simply not take action?283  
One response, affording maximum likely deterrent effect, would be to 
simply adopt a blanket rule categorically denying police use of identity 
 
are distinct Fourth Amendment events: 
We recognize that DNA profiles are an important law enforcement tool for 
investigating crimes other than those charged . . . .  But one accused of a crime . . . does 
not forfeit Fourth Amendment protections with respect to other offenses not charged 
absent either probable cause or reasonable suspicion.  An arrest for vehicular homicide, 
for example, cannot alone justify a warrantless search of an arrestee’s financial records 
to see if he is also an embezzler. 
Mario W. v. Kaipio, 281 P.3d 476, 483 (Ariz. 2012) (citation omitted); cf. State ex rel. Reed 
v. Harris, 153 S.W.2d 834, 837 (Mo. 1941) (stating that, in the absence of affirmative 
statutory authority for police to disseminate records, “there is a marked difference between 
making an adequate record of the identity of a person lawfully in custody . . . and the 
dissemination of the photographs and fingerprints of an innocent person about whose 
identity there can be no question”). 
280 See supra note 233 and accompanying text; cf. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 
U.S. 32, 44 (2000) (acknowledging concern over “stops justified only by a generalized and 
ever-present possibility that interrogation and inspection may reveal that any given motorist 
has committed some crime”).   
281 See, e.g., Russell D. Covey, Pervasive Surveillance and the Future of the Fourth 
Amendment, 80 MISS. L.J. 1289, 1316-18 (2011); Orin S. Kerr, Use Restrictions and the 
Future of Surveillance Law, in CONSTITUTION 3.0: FREEDOM AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 
37, 39 (Jeffrey Rosen & Benjamin Wittes eds., 2011) (“Instead of focusing solely on the 
initial collection of information, we need to distribute regulation along the entire spectrum 
of the surveillance process.  The future of surveillance is a future of use restrictions – rules 
that strictly regulate what the government can do with information it has collected and 
processed.”);  cf. Harold J. Krent, Of Diaries and Data Banks: Use Restrictions Under the 
Fourth Amendment, 74 TEX. L. REV. 49, 60 (1995) (“Particularly in light of new technology, 
privacy is threatened as much by what law enforcement authorities do with information as 
by the original acquisition itself.”). 
282 United States v. Navarro-Diaz, 420 F.3d 581, 587 (6th Cir. 2005).  
283 This issue was a major focus of attention in the Tolentino oral argument.  See 
Transcript of Oral Argument at 16, Tolentino v. New York, 131 S. Ct. 595 (2010) (No. 09-
11556). 
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information secured.  Professor Ric Simmons, for instance, recently advanced 
such a view in the context of suspicionless searches undertaken to combat 
terrorism, advocating that police be able to intercede to prevent possible 
calamities, but not be allowed to use any evidentiary fruits thereby secured in a 
criminal prosecution.284  Doing so, which Professor Simmons concedes is 
“radical” and “politically unpalatable,”285 would obviate the ongoing strained 
efforts of courts to find a preventive, non-crime control purpose behind 
antiterrorism searches.286  
Less extreme and preferable is the option of applying the traditional tools 
used in exclusionary rule analysis: attenuation, independent source, and 
inevitable discovery.287  Resort to these tools, rather than making identity 
evidence “sacred and inaccessible,”288 can help resolve the practical problems 
noted above when police unlawfully learn a detainee’s identity and then make 
investigative use of this information in a government database to prosecute. 
If, for instance, police learn that a detainee is the subject of a lawful 
outstanding arrest warrant, the detainee can be arrested and, consistent with 
precedent, be subject to the formal jurisdiction of the court.289  In such a 
situation, barring prosecution would afford the detainee what is seen as an 
unjustified windfall.290  It is thus unlike scenarios such as in Tolentino, where 
 
284 Ric Simmons, Searching for Terrorists: Why Public Safety Is Not a Special Need, 59 
DUKE L.J. 843, 915-19 (2010). 
285 Id. at 915.   
286 Id. at 891 (asserting that the conclusion that such searches have a “public safety 
purpose rather than a law-enforcement or crime-control purpose is simply disingenuous”); 
see also STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & DANIEL J. CAPRA, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: 
CASES AND COMMENTARY 382-85 (8th ed. 2007) (citing cases in support and noting the 
difficulty of distinguishing between search purposes).   
287 For an overview of the doctrines see JAMES J. TOMKOVICZ, CONSTITUTIONAL 
EXCLUSION: THE RULES, RIGHTS, AND REMEDIES THAT STRIKE THE BALANCE BETWEEN 
FREEDOM AND ORDER 42-51 (2011).  Of course, merely because identity evidence can be 
secured by other lawful means does not redeem its use or admission.  See Davis v. 
Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 725 n.4 (1969) (stating that “the fact that equivalent evidence can 
conveniently be obtained in a wholly proper way” does not suffice as a reason for not 
excluding the fruits of police misconduct given that the threatened exclusion seeks to make 
“those administering the criminal law understand that they must” obtain evidence legally). 
288 Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920).  
289 See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 119 (1975) (explaining “the established rule that 
illegal arrest or detention does not void a subsequent conviction”); Frisbie v. Collins, 342 
U.S. 519, 522 (1952) (explaining that the “power of a court to try a person for a crime is not 
impaired by the fact that he had been brought within the court’s jurisdiction by reasons of a 
‘forcible abduction’” (quoting Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 444 (1886))).    
290 This is not to say, however, that evidence secured as a result of a search conducted 
incident to arrest, based on a discovered lawful arrest warrant, should be immune to possible 
exclusion.  The issue remains the subject of ongoing disagreement, turning on whether the 
discovered warrant dissipates the taint of the initial illegal seizure.  Compare United States 
v. Gross, 662 F.3d 393, 404-05 (6th Cir. 2011) (applying exclusionary rule and barring 
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identity serves as the crucial evidentiary nexus for as-yet uninvestigated 
matters, independent of jurisdiction, relative to which the exclusionary rule 
should be allowed to exercise its deterrent influence.291  
The “continuing offense” scenario, at issue in “status” crimes such as 
criminal immigration violations or when sex offenders are not in compliance 
with registration requirements, poses a more vexing difficulty.292  With 
immigration, the answer actually lies in language found in Lopez-Mendoza 
itself – deportation:  
The constable’s blunder may allow the criminal to go free, but we have 
never suggested that it allows the criminal to continue in the commission 
of an ongoing crime.  When the crime in question involves unlawful 
presence in this country, the criminal may go free, but he should not go 
free within our borders.293   
With a sex offender registration violation, the effect of discovered identity is 
not so readily reconcilable.  Courts, however, applying attenuation and 
independent source analysis, have found ways to preserve admissible use of 
identity evidence.294  
What might be called a single-act offense, such as that engaged in by the 
motorist in Tolentino prosecuted for driving with a suspended license,295 can 
 
evidence of unrelated crime secured as a result of search incident to arrest), with United 
States v. Johnson, 383 F.3d 538, 546 (7th Cir. 2004) (rejecting application of exclusionary 
rule and allowing evidence to be used).  For analysis of the split, favoring exclusion, see 
State v. Moralez, 242 P.3d 223, 241-53 (Kan. Ct. App. 2011) (Atcheson, J., dissenting). 
291 This is especially so given judicial failure to regulate the use of identity evidence 
secured by a past illegal arrest, and later used to identify a detainee lawfully seized on a 
subsequent occasion.  See LAFAVE, supra note 3, § 11.4(g), at 358-60 nn.404-08 (citing 
cases reaching varying results on whether photos secured as a result of illegal seizures are  
admissible).  As Professor LaFave urges, courts should be “vigilant” in guarding against 
police efforts to increase the reservoir of identity data at their disposal, which can later be 
drawn upon.  Id. at 360.  In earlier times, as discussed above, identity evidence was typically 
destroyed when a conviction was not secured.  See supra notes 108-122 and accompanying 
text.   
292 See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1046 (1984) (identifying the “unique” 
social cost of applying the exclusionary rule to “continuing violations of the law,” and  
stating that doing so “would require the courts to close their eyes to ongoing violations of 
the law”). 
293 Id. at 1047.  It is also likely the case that the deportation proceeding would itself 
allow for collection of untainted identity evidence, including fingerprints, with the latter 
being admitted pursuant to the inevitable discovery doctrine.  
294 See, e.g., United States v. Carter, 573 F.3d 418, 423 (7th Cir. 2009) (finding that a 
photo of an unregistered sex offender discovered during an unlawful search was admissible 
in a robbery trial under attenuation analysis).  
295 As for the facts in Tolentino, police, acting pursuant to their public safety authority, 
could have lawfully impounded the vehicle upon discovery of the violation, thereby abating 
the safety threat Tolentino’s unlicensed driving presented.  See  People v. Tolentino, 926 
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also be addressed by traditional exclusionary rule doctrine.  Police could, for 
instance, secure identity evidence on an independent basis (e.g., as a result of a 
consensual encounter296) or as a result of a lawful seizure based upon a myriad 
of state, local, and federal provisions.297  The latter authority is especially 
expansive in the enforcement of motor vehicle-related laws, a context long 
acknowledged by officers themselves as being rife with ready opportunities for 
lawful stops and arrests.298  Alternatively, consistent with attenuation 
doctrine,299 police could monitor the individual to see if he or she again 
engaged in the same misconduct after a passage of time and execute a lawful 
seizure.300 
If, however, the individual remains law-abiding and no exception applies, 
the full effect of the exclusionary rule sanction would come into play: the 
identity evidence and its connection to an incriminating government database 
could not be used.301  The result, as has so often been highlighted in 
exclusionary rule debates more generally,302 stems from the rule itself, which 
while perennially under assault, remains central to enforcement of 
constitutional criminal procedure protections.  Police, as the Supreme Court 
has insisted, would not be put “‘in a worse position than they would have been 
in absent [the] error or violation.’”303  They simply would not be advantaged 
by their unlawful conduct. 
 
N.E.2d 1212, 1213-14 (N.Y. 2010).       
296 See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497 (1983) (holding that officers can ask 
individuals questions, including those related to identity, without triggering Fourth 
Amendment concerns).  
297 See Logan, supra note 153, at 91-94 (discussing the extensive seizure authority 
afforded to police by the array of low-level, malum prohibitum offenses contained in various 
state codes).  
298 See, e.g., David A. Harris, The Stories, the Statistics, and the Law: Why “Driving 
While Black” Matters, 84 MINN. L. REV. 265, 310-11 (1999); David E. Steinberg, The Drive 
Toward Warrantless Auto Searches: Suggestions from a Back Seat Driver, 80 B.U. L. REV. 
545, 564-67 (2000) (discussing the many legal bases to stop motorists).  
299 See Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-04 (1975) (identifying attenuation factors as:  
the amount of time elapsing between illegality and receipt of evidence; “the presence of 
intervening circumstances”; and “the purpose and flagrancy” of police misconduct).   
300 See LAFAVE, supra note 3, § 11.4(a), at 258-65 (surveying cases in which courts 
found sufficient attenuation).  
301 Even more unpalatable to some, this is so relative both to the relatively minor traffic 
violation alleged in Tolentino and more serious offenses.  To date, application of the 
exclusionary rule typically has not turned on crime seriousness.  See, e.g., Mincey v. 
Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978) (rejecting a Fourth Amendment “murder scene” 
exception).  
302 For an example of the competing views see, for example, the concurrences of Judges 
Lay and Bowman in United States v. Jefferson, 906 F.2d 346, 351-53 (8th Cir. 1990). 
303 Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 537 (1988) (quoting Nix v. Williams, 467 
U.S. 431, 443 (1984)).  
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In this connection, it is important to emphasize the crucial evidentiary role 
played by identity vis-à-vis government databases.  Contrary to the view of the 
New York Court of Appeals in Tolentino, it is not determinative that “public 
records [are] already in the possession of authorities.”304  Rather, the records 
accessed by police in Tolentino qualify as quintessential secondary, derivative 
evidence, the legal materiality of which only came about as a result of their 
misconduct.305  
Nor does language in United States v. Crews,306 to the effect that the 
exclusionary rule “does not reach backward to taint information that was in 
official hands prior to any illegality,”307 dictate to the contrary.  In Crews, the 
evidence at issue – an in-court identification by a witness – had an 
independent, preexistent factual basis, which “neither resulted from nor was 
biased by the unlawful police conduct.”308  In Tolentino, police were wholly 
unaware that the defendant was driving with a suspended license and would 
not have learned of the suspension had they not exploited an illegal seizure to 
learn Tolentino’s identity and access information contained in a government 
database.  The police misconduct, unlike in Crews, provided something “of 
evidentiary value that the police did not already have in their grasp”309: it 
“link[ed] together two extant ingredients in [the] identification”310 – Tolentino 
and his unlawful motorist status.  
CONCLUSION 
The goal of this Article has been part archival and part normative.  The 
archival goal has been to highlight the centrality of identity evidence to 
policing over time.  “Spotting,” “rogues galleries,” and anthropometric 
measurements, all used long ago by police to overcome criminal anonymity, 
 
304 People v. Tolentino, 926 N.E.2d 1212, 1215 (N.Y. 2010). 
305 Standing – in particular whether the illegally seized detainee can contest use of the 
records accessed as a result of the identity evidence – should be resolved on the basis of 
traditional doctrine.  See United States v. Olivares-Rangel, 458 F.3d 1104, 1117 (10th Cir. 
2006) (concluding that it is not the case that standing exists “only when the defendant has 
standing regarding both the violation which constitutes the poisonous tree and separate 
standing regarding the evidence which constitutes the fruit of the poisonous tree”).  Not all 
courts have so held, however.  See LAFAVE, supra note 3, § 11.4, at 258 n.18 (citing 
decisions taking the “erroneous approach” of requiring independent standing as to the 
government records accessed).   
306 445 U.S. 463 (1980).  
307 Id. at 475.  
308 Id. at 473. 
309 Id. at 475.  
310 Id.; see also Olivares-Rangel, 458 F.3d at 1120 (suppressing “previously compiled 
Government records” when obtained through “exploitation of an illegal search and seizure 
[that] produced the critical link between a defendant’s identity and his . . . criminal history 
record”). 
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are but the technological forebears of the sophisticated biometric identification 
strategies used today.311  
Yet, as this Article also makes clear, as identification and policing methods 
have evolved over time, the American justice system has not kept pace.  While 
early identification efforts met with constraint, a second major wave of 
innovation has been met with a troubling blasé acceptance based on a 
superficial historicism and an under-appreciation of changes in American 
policing and the power and breadth of modern databases.312  
The current state of affairs, while regrettable for all the reasons mentioned, 
should serve as a warning to be heeded.  Much as we have recently awakened 
to the forensic fallibility of identity evidence methods, such as fingerprints, 
after decades of judicial acceptance,313 we must resist any technological 
determinism that blinds us to the consequences of the methods being used to 
create indices of identity in the name of social control.  The discussion here, 
and the analytic framework offered to address two particularly problematic 
aspects of the broader challenge presented by identity evidence, will hopefully 
serve as a starting point in this effort. 
 
 
311 See, e.g., KELLY A. GATES, OUR BIOMETRIC FUTURE: FACIAL RECOGNITION 
TECHNOLOGY AND THE CULTURE OF SURVEILLANCE 89-90 (2011) (describing efforts by 
Tampa police to justify use of facial recognition technology by likening the technique to 
“age-old” police practices of carrying photos or “hot sheets” of wanted individuals).      
312 Indeed, the term “database” itself did not emerge until the 1960s when computers first 
facilitated military access to data accumulated in information repositories.  See Thomas 
Haigh, “A Veritable Bucket of Facts”: Origins of the Data Base Management System, 
SIGMOD REC., June 2006, at 33, 35.  
313 See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., supra note 104, at 4-5, 97-98.  
